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|TextArbeit=Trigeorgis (1993) points out that early critics (Dean, Hayes and Abernathy, and Hayes and Garvin) also recognized that standard DCF criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations. |
|TextArbeit=Trigeorgis (1993) points out that early critics (Dean, Hayes and Abernathy, and Hayes and Garvin) also recognized that standard DCF criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations. |
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| + | Trigeorgis, L. 1993, “Real Options and Interactions with Financial Flexibility”, ''Financial Management'', vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 202-224. |
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|TextQuelle=Garvin [36] recognized that standard discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations. |
|TextQuelle=Garvin [36] recognized that standard discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations. |
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| + | 36. R. Hayes and D. Garvin. "Managing as if Tomorrow Mattered." ''Harvard Business Review'' (May-June 1982). pp. 71-79 |
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Version vom 17. Januar 2020, 22:55 Uhr
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 74, Zeilen: 12-17 |
Quelle: Trigeorgis 1993 Seite(n): 205, Zeilen: left col., 1 ff. |
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| Trigeorgis (1993) points out that early critics (Dean, Hayes and Abernathy, and Hayes and Garvin) also recognized that standard DCF criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations.
Trigeorgis, L. 1993, “Real Options and Interactions with Financial Flexibility”, Financial Management, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 202-224. |
Garvin [36] recognized that standard discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria often undervalued investment opportunities, leading to myopic decisions, underinvestment and eventual loss of competitive position, because they either ignored or did not properly value important strategic considerations.
36. R. Hayes and D. Garvin. "Managing as if Tomorrow Mattered." Harvard Business Review (May-June 1982). pp. 71-79 |
Source is given. No quotation marks, however. |
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