von Prof. Dr. Ronald Moeder
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| [1.] Rm/Fragment 204 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2022-02-23 15:02:55 Numer0nym | Bradley 1994, Fragment, Gesichtet, Rm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, ÜbersetzungsPlagiat |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 204, Zeilen: 1-30 |
Quelle: Bradley 1994 Seite(n): 96, 97, Zeilen: S. 96: 25ff, S. 97: 1ff |
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| [Gleichzeitig legte das House of Lords dem EuGH die Frage vor, ob es ein überragendes Prinzip des Gemeinschaftsrechts gäbe, demzufolge die nationalen Gerichte gehalten seien, einstweiligen Rechtsschutz im Hinblick] auf die bestehenden Gemeinschaftsrechte des Antragstellers gewähren zu müssen.
Nach Zurückverweisung an das House of Lords musste dieses - bei pflichtgemäßer Ermessensausübung - darüber entscheiden, ob den Antragstellern der einstweilige Rechtsschutz zu gewähren war, den der EuGH für in die Kompetenz der englischen Gerichte fallend beurteilt hatte. Die Law Lords gewährten eine entsprechende einstweilige Verfügung (interim injunction) gegen den britischen Transportminister (Secretary of State for Transport), indem es die (vorläufige) Austragung spanischer Schiffe aus dem britischen Schiffsregister anordnete. Das Argument, die Entscheidung des EuGH sei eine neue und gefährliche Unterminierung des Grundsatzes von der Parlamentssouveränität, wies Lord Bridge zurück: „If the supremacy ... of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the E.C. Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act was entirely voluntary. [There] is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights under Community law, national courts must not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that supremay [sic!].”1171 1170 Vgl. R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 A.C., 603 (643). 1171 Vgl. a.a.O. (FN 1170), 603 (658 f.). |
But the House of Lords referred to the European Court of Justice the question of whether there was an 'overriding principle of Community law' that required national courts to secure effective interim protection for the applicants' rights in Community law.
[Seite 97] contrary to Community law. Thus, any rule of national law that prevented a court from granting interim relief had to be set aside by that court. When the case came back to the House of Lords, the House had to consider in the exercise of its discretion whether to grant the interim relief which the European Court had held was within the power of the English courts; the House duly granted an injunction against the Secretary of State from removing the Spanish-owned ships from the register of British fishing vessels. On the main constitutional question, Lord Bridge rejected the view that the decision of the European Court of Justice was a novel and dangerous invasion by a Community institution of the sovereignty of Parliament, saying: If the supremacy . . . of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act was entirely voluntary. [There] is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply and to insist that, in the protection of rights under Community law, national courts must not be inhibited by rules of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no more than a logical recognition of that supremacy.71 70 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) [1991] 1 AC 603, 643. 71 Ibid. 658-9; and see N. Gravells (1991) Public Law 180; and H. W. R. Wade (1991) 107 LQR 1. |
An einer Stelle leicht gekürzt, ansonsten wörtliche Übersetzung, die an einer Stelle den Sinn der Aussage verkehrt: eine einstweilige Anordnung "against the Secretary of State from removing the Spanish-owned ships from the register" verbietet dem Minister die Austragung, während Rm anordnen lässt, dass der Minister die Schiffe austragen muss - ein weiteres Indiz, dass Rm die Entscheidung nicht gelesen hat. Sowohl die Version von Bradley als auch die von Rm weichen geringfügig vom Original des Urteils ab, das an der entscheidenden Stelle lautet: "If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the E.E.C. Treaty (Cmnd. 5179-II) ..." Rm kopiert die Auslassungen von Bradley. Bradley wird auf der gesamten Seite nicht erwähnt. |
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Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:PlagProf:-), Zeitstempel: 20130427155052