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| Titel | TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 1. A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century |
| Herausgeber | US Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| Ort | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas |
| Ausgabe | Version 3.0 |
| Datum | 15. August 2005 |
| URL | http://web.archive.org/web/20060110065831/http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/index.html |
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| Fußnoten | yes |
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| 2.1 OVERVIEW[FN 9]
“Terrorism is a psychological act that communicates through the medium of violence or the threat of violence” (Gunaratna, R., 2000). Terrorist strategies will be aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring horror. Timing, location, and method of attacks accommodate media dissemination and ensure “newsworthiness” to maximize impact. A terrorist operation will often have the goal of manipulating popular perceptions, and will achieve this by controlling or dictating media coverage. This control need not be evident, as terrorists analyze and exploit the dynamics of major media outlets and the pressure of the “news cycle” (Hoffman, B., 1998). The bombing of commuter trains in Madrid is one example of such theory. The true cause behind Madrid bombing is not determined yet. However, one view is that terrorists who specifically planned to influence the political process in Spain conducted the attacks. They believed that the public would feel the current government responsible, as the large percentage of population was against the involvement of Spanish forces in Iraq war. The attacks occurred during the morning rush hour just three days prior to the national elections. Timing the attack played a vital role in maximizing casualties on the trains (killing 191 people and injuring more than 1800), and immediate world over news coverage. Although, there are fair chances of coincidence, but an anti-war Socialist prime minister was elected in the following election who quickly withdrew Spain’s military forces from Iraq. [FN 9] Some parts of this Sections are taken from ”A Military Guide to Terrorism in 21st Century“ |
[FN 110]
[...] Terrorism is a psychological act that communicates through the medium of violence or the threat of violence. Terrorist strategies will be aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring fear. Timing, location, and method of attacks accommodate media dissemination and ensure “newsworthiness” to maximize impact. A terrorist operation will often have the goal of manipulating popular perceptions, and will achieve this by controlling or dictating media coverage. This control need not be overt, as terrorists analyze and exploit the dynamics of major media outlets and the pressure of the “news cycle.”[FN 111] A terrorist attack that appears to follow this concept was the bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain in March 2004. [...] One view is that Islamic terrorists who specifically planned to influence the political process in Spain conducted the attacks. They believed that the large percentage of the Spanish population opposed the war in Iraq and would feel that the current government was responsible for the bombings, and would therefore vote for the opposition. The attacks occurred during morning rush hour just three days prior to national elections. The timing facilitated maximum casualties on the trains (killing 191 people and injuring more than 1800), plus immediate news coverage throughout the world of the carnage resulting from this terrorist attack. Although it cannot definitively be linked to the bombings, an anti-war Socialist prime minister was elected who quickly withdrew Spain’s military forces from Iraq. [FN 110] Rohan Gunaratna, “Suicide Terrorism: a Global Threat,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (20 October 2000): 1-7; available from http://www.janes.com/security /international_security/ news/usscole/jir001020_1_n.shtml; Internet; accessed 7 September 2002. [FN 111] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 136-142. |
The footnote mentions the source (however without telling the version of the document, nor any bibliographical details). This is done in a way that makes not clear to the reader, what exactly is taken from the source. |
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| [A] massively launched attack against a target which will not yield enough media coverage is not viable for terrorists as compared to a small attack against a “media accessible” target. However, with the spread of the global media, many locations have potential to become attractive targets that would not have been considered thirty or forty years ago.
The 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are an example showing how these two relatively unimportant posts created a global sensation because of the modern media coverage. Forty years ago it would have taken days for the international news media to get photographs and relevant text from these locations, making them much less attractive targets in those days. However, with modern technology, it was possible to provide immediate broadcast coverage of the incident. Since the religious justification was the known cause behind the attacks, but still the worldwide coverage of these attacks made it possible for these terrorists to pose as champions of a cause, even in the absence of any effective work at the grassroots level of society (Kepel, G., 2002). The September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City was observed live on television by millions of people |
[p 2-10] In considering possible terrorist targets, recognize that a massively destructive attack launched against a target that cannot or will not attract sufficient media coverage to impact the target audience is not a viable target for terrorists. A small attack against a “media accessible” target is better than a larger one of less publicity. However, the spread of the global media makes many locations attractive targets that would not have been remotely considered thirty or forty years ago. The 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate how these two relatively unimportant posts created a global sensation because of the media coverage. Forty years ago it would have taken days for the international news media to get still photographs and some text from these locations, making them much less attractive targets. However, with today’s modern technology, media reporters were able to provide immediate broadcast coverage of the bombings. Since the Islamist factions that conducted the attacks used religious justifications for their actions, the worldwide coverage of these attacks made it possible for these terrorists to pose as champions of a cause, even in the absence of any effective work at the grassroots level of society. [FN 112] The September 11, 2001 bombing of
[FN 112] Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press): 320. [p. 2-11] the World Trade Center in New York City was observed by millions of people worldwide on live television as the successive attacks occurred and sensational mass destruction followed. |
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| [Since in the case of larger structure, nearly all organizations follow the] variants of cellular organizations at strategic and tactical level to enhance security. It also facilitates better management and organization of operations.
Terror groups often require political activity and hierarchical structure to coordinate violence with a political action. It may also be necessary for a politically affiliated group to observe cease-fire agreements or avoid particular targets in support of political objectives. This can be difficult to enforce in networked organizations. Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Newer groups having fewer resources will usually lack capability and experience, and operate in permissive areas or under the control of more proficient organizations. Change in terrorist leadership may signal significant adjustments to organizational priorities and means of conducting terrorism. The terrorist groups associated with ethnic or nationalist agendas operating in one country or a localized region tend to require fewer capabilities as compared to larger groups. Larger groups can coalesce from smaller organizations, or smaller groups can splinter off from larger ones. 2.5 TERRORIST GROUP STRUCTURE Members or supporters of terrorist organization can be classified into four types based on their level of commitments: passive supporters, active supporters, cadre, and leadership. Figure 2.1 shows how each successive level of commitment has fewer members. This pyramid diagram shows the relative number of people in each category and not the organizational structure. It is valid for either network or hierarchical organizational structure. Passive supporters may mix together with active supporters and are not aware of their actual relationship with the organization. |
Within the larger structure, though, virtually all groups use variants of cellular organizations at the tactical level to enhance security and to organize for operations.
Terrorist groups that are associated with a political activity or organization will often require a more hierarchical structure, in order to coordinate terrorist violence with political action. It also can be necessary for a politically affiliated group to observe cease-fire agreements or avoid particular targets in support of political objectives. This can be difficult to enforce in networked organizations. Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Newer groups with fewer resources will usually be less capable, and operate in permissive areas or under the tutelage of more proficient organizations to develop proficiency. Change in terrorist leadership, [...] may signal significant adjustments to organizational priorities and means of conducting terrorism. Also, groups professing or associated with ethnic or nationalist agendas and limiting their operations to one country or a localized region tend to require fewer capabilities. Larger groups can coalesce from smaller organizations, or smaller groups can splinter off from larger ones. [p. 3-2] Section I: Terrorist Group Structure [...] There are typically different levels of commitment within an organization: passive supporters, active supporters, cadre, and leadership. Figure 3-1 shows how each successive level of commitment has fewer members. This pyramid diagram is not intended as an organizational picture, but to show the relative number of people in each category. This image of overall density holds true for networks as well as hierarchies. Passive supporters may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of what their actual relationship is to the organization. |
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| • Passive supporters are motivated by the announced goals of the terrorist organization. They may have ideological sympathy with the terrorist organization, however they are not committed enough to take any action. Passive supporters are often unaware of their real relation with the terrorist
organization. However, they are used for political activities, fund raising campaigns, gathering assisting in gathering intelligence and other nonviolent activities. Sometimes fear of reprisal from terrorists is a compelling factor in passive support. |
• Passive Supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of the terrorist organization, but are not committed enough to take action. They may not be aware of their precise relation to the terrorist group, and interface with a front that hides the overt connection to the terrorist group. Sometimes fear of reprisal from terrorists is a compelling factor in passive support. Sympathizers can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and unwitting or coerced assistance in intelligence gathering or other non-violent activities. |
continuation from previous page - the source is only mentioned as reference for figure 2.1. on the same page, but not as reference for anything else. On this and the next page, Nm will present more or less word-for-word the description of each of the four "levels of commitment", which can be found in the source, by using large chunks of the original wording and putting it together with slightly different "stuffing". Another "major" change he will introduce is the permutation of the order of the various descriptions ("bottum-up" instead of "top-down"). |
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| • Active Supporters actively participate in the political, fundraising, and information activities of the group. They may also conduct initial intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safe houses, financial contributions, medical assistance, and transit assistance for active members of the organization. They do not commit or engage them in violence, but are usually fully aware of their relationship to the terrorist group and motives of the organization. | • Active Supporters are active in the political, fund-raising, and information activities of the group. Acting as an ally or tacit partner, they may also conduct initial intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safehaven houses, financial contributions, medical assistance, and transit assistance for active members of the organization. They are usually fully aware of their relationship to the terrorist group but do not commit violent acts. |
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| Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and similar direct actors in terrorism and violent plans. | Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and similar direct action terrorists in an attack. |
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| • Leaders design organizational policy and provide directions. They approve goals and objectives and provide management and guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of any given organization, or create their own organization from scratch. | • Leaders provide direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and provide overarching guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of any given organization, or create their own organization from scratch. |
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| Terrorist groups will recruit from the population having sympathy to their goals. Often legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. For example: Militant Islamic recruiting is often associated with the proliferation of the radical Wahhabi sect. The recruitment takes place via Wahhabist schools worldwide, financed from both governmental and private donations and grants (Corpus N. Victor, 2002). In the time of need, particular skills or qualification is also considered during recruitment. Of particular concern are attempts of terrorist organizations to recruit current or former members of the armed forces, both as trained operatives, and as agents in place.
Recruitment can gain operatives from many diverse social backgrounds. At times, the approach to radical behaviour or direct actions with terrorism can develop over the course of years or decades. One example is John Walker Lindh. Lindh was the U.S. citizen, captured by U.S. military forces during the war in Afghanistan. His notoriety jumped into international attention, as did the situation of individuals from several counties that were apprehended in combat actions of Afghanistan. Lindh was changed from an unassuming middle-class adolescent in the Western United States to a member of a paramilitary training camp in Pakistan and his subsequent support for Taliban forces in Afghanistan spotlights that general profiling should be tempered with specific instances [and a broad perspective.] |
[p. 3-2]
Terrorist groups will recruit from populations that are sympathetic to their goals. Often legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. Militant Islamic recruiting, for example, is often associated with the proliferation of the radical Wahhabi sect. This recruiting is conducted on a worldwide basis via Wahhabist schools financed from both governmental and non-governmental donations and grants. [FN 128] Some recruiting may be conducted for particular skills and qualifications, and not be tied to ideological characteristics. Of particular concern are attempts of terrorist organizations to recruit current or former members of the U.S. armed forces, both as trained operatives, and as agents in place. [FN 128] Victor N. Corpus, “The Invisible Army” (Briefing presented at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2002), TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Files, Fort Leavenworth, KS. [p. 3-3] Recruitment can gain operatives from many diverse social backgrounds. At times, the approach to radical behavior or direct actions with terrorism can develop over the course of years or decades. One example is John Walker Lindh, the U.S. citizen captured by U.S. military forces in the war in Afghanistan. His notoriety jumped into international attention, as did the situation of individuals from several counties that were apprehended in combat actions of Afghanistan. Lindh’s change from an unassuming middle-class adolescent in the Western United States to a member of a paramilitary training camp in Pakistan and subsequent support for Taliban forces in Afghanistan spotlights that general profiling should be tempered with specific instances and a broad perspective. |
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| Another stunning case was of Jose Padilla. He attempted very simple and voluntary efforts to detonate a bomb in the U.S. This illustrates Al Qaeda techniques to support, finance, and use less sophisticated means to conduct terrorist acts.
Some groups will also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful individuals. Blackmailing and intimidation are the commonly exerted coercion forms by terrorist organizations to gain cooperation of useful individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere like acquiring the useful information to conduct a suicide bombing operation (Reich Walter, 1998). Threats to family members are also employed. Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations. |
In the case of Jose Padilla, his simple and voluntary efforts to detonate a bomb in the U.S. may illustrate al Qaeda techniques to support, finance, and use less than sophisticated means to conduct terrorist acts.
[FIGURE] Some groups will also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing operation. [FN 129] Blackmail and intimidation are the most common forms of coercion. Threats to family members are also employed. Coercion is often directed at personnel in government security and intelligence organizations. [FN 129] Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 270-271. |
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| 2.6 TACTICAL-LEVEL CELLULAR ORGANIZATION
The smallest elements at the tactical level of terrorist organizations are the cells that serve as building-blocks for the terrorist organization. One of the primary reasons for a cellular or compartmentalized structure is security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells. A cellular organizational structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and, therefore, cannot divulge sensitive information to infiltrators or captors. The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an excellent example of the cellular organization. The homepage ELF site states that ELF is modelled after Animal Liberation Front in the structured way to maximize the effectiveness. Operating in cells not only guarantees the security of group members but also such decentralized structure [helps to continue conducting actions.] |
Tactical-level Cellular Organization
The smallest elements at the tactical level of terrorist organizations are the cells that serve as building blocks for the terrorist organization. One of the primary reasons for a cellular or compartmentalized structure is security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells. A cellular organizational structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and, therefore, cannot divulge sensitive information to infiltrators or captors. The home page of the Earth Liberation Front is an excellent example of this cellular organization. It states, “Modeled after the Animal Liberation Front, the E.L.F. is structured in such a way as to maximize effectiveness. By operating in cells (small groups that consist of one to several people), the security of group members is maintained. [...] This decentralized structure helps keep activists out of jail and free to continue conducting actions.” |
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| [Operating in cells not only guarantees the security of group members but also such decentralized structure] helps to continue conducting actions.
Terrorists may organize cells based on family or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action and intelligence. Terrorist groups may also form multifunctional cells and these cells may be used by terrorist groups to control its members. Cell members remain in close contact with each other in order to provide emotional support and to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures. Cell leaders are normally the people who communicate and coordinate with higher levels and other cells. A terrorist group may form only one cell or may form many cells that operate locally, trans-nationally, or internationally. The composition, size and number of cells in the terrorist organization depend on the size of the terrorist group itself. An international terrorist group operating in more than within one country has more cells than the one operating in a single country or limited territory. |
This decentralized structure helps keep activists out of jail and free to continue conducting actions.”
Terrorists may organize cells based on family or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action and intelligence. The terrorist group may also form multifunctional cells. The terrorist group uses the cells to control its members. Cell members remain in close contact with each other in order to provide emotional support and to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures. The cell leader is normally the only person who communicates and coordinates with higher levels and other cells. A terrorist group may form only one cell or may form many cells that operate locally, transnationally, or internationally. The number of cells and their composition depend on the size of the terrorist group. A terrorist group operating within one country frequently has fewer cells and specialized teams than does an international terrorist group that may operate in several countries. |
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| 2.7 GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
As stated earlier, there are two basic models used when examining the overall organizational structure of a terrorist group. These are the hierarchical and the networked models. A terrorist group may employ either type or a combination of the two models. 2.7.1 Hierarchical Structure Hierarchical structure organizations maintain a well-defined vertical chain of command, authority and responsibility. Data and intelligence flows up and down organizational channels that correspond to these non-horizontal chains, but may not move horizontally through the organization. This is more traditional, and is common of groups that are well established with a command and support structure. |
Group Organizational Structure
As stated earlier, there are two basic models used when examining the overall organizational structure of a terrorist group. These are the hierarchical and the networked models. A terrorist group may employ either type or a combination of the two models. Hierarchical Structure Hierarchical structure organizations are those that have a well-defined vertical chain of command linkage and responsibility. Data and intelligence flows up and down organizational channels that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not move horizontally through the organization. This is more traditional, and is common of groups that are well established with a command and support structure. |
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| Hierarchical structure offers the organizations greater specialization of functions in their subordinate cells (support, operations, intelligence). Usually, the leader of cell is aware of other cells or contacts of the organization (may be to a limited extent) and only senior leadership has visibility of the organization at large. In the past, terrorism was practiced in this manner by identifiable organizations with a command and control structure influenced by ideology or theory of revolution. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA group, conformed to this stereotype of the "traditional" terrorist group. These organizations had a clearly defined set of political, social or economic objectives, and tailored aspects of their organizations (such as a “political” wing or “social welfare” group) to facilitate their success. The necessity to coordinate actions between various “fronts,” some of which were political and allegedly non-violent, and the use of violence by terrorists and some insurgents, favoured a hierarchical command structure.
2.7.2 Networked Structure Terrorists are in this decade become increasingly part of far more joint and wider system of networks than experienced before. Groups based on religious or single-issue motives lack a specific political or patriotic agenda; non-horizontal structure is thus less needed. Instead, they can depend and even thrive on loose association with like-minded clusters or people from a diversity of places. General objectives and goals are announced, and operation and initiative is left to the individuals or cells. |
Hierarchical organizations feature greater specialization of functions in their subordinate cells (support, operations, intelligence). Usually, only the cell leader has knowledge of other cells or contacts, and only senior leadership has visibility of the organization at large. In the past, terrorism was practiced in this manner by identifiable organizations with a command and
[Page 3-5] control structure influenced by revolutionary theory or ideology. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA group, conformed to this stereotype of the "traditional" terrorist group. These organizations had a clearly defined set of political, social or economic objectives, and tailored aspects of their organizations (such as a “political” wing or “social welfare” group) to facilitate their success. The necessity to coordinate actions between various “fronts,” some of which were political and allegedly nonviolent, and the use of violence by terrorists and some insurgents, favored a strong and hierarchical authority structure. Networked Structure Terrorists are now increasingly part of far more indistinct and broader system of networks than previously experienced. Groups based on religious or single-issue motives lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda; they therefore have less need for a hierarchical structure to coordinate the achievement of their goals. Instead, they can depend and even thrive on loose affiliation with like-minded groups or individuals from a variety of locations. General goals and targets are announced, and individuals or cells are expected to use flexibility and initiative to conduct the necessary action. |
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| [FIGURE, identical to source]
Figure 2.2. Typical Categories of Terrorist Organization |
[FIGURE]
Figure 3-2. Typical Categories of Terrorist Organization |
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| 2.9 TERRORIST CHARACTERISTICS
Terrorists do not have a single or general personality profile. Meaning, no single analytical test exist which promises empathy of a terrorist. Although, many terrorism related studies have been conducted by analyzing the biographical and social data on known terrorists, with goal to develop some form of terrorist profile. However, none of them truly succeeded as they have just shown that in general, terrorists are people who often feel isolated from society and have a complaint or regard themselves as victims of an inequality. Political or religious reasons help as a commitment to the terrorists and they do not regard their violent actions as criminal. They show no pity or regret for their actions. Although their level of [complexity will vary depending on the individual and the specific terrorist group, terrorists are people who are skilled and brutal in leading terrorist acts (Hudson, A. R, 1999).] |
Section III: Terrorist Characteristics
No singular personality profile of a terrorist exists, and no predictive test exists that can guarantee identification of a terrorist. Numerous terrorism-related studies have analyzed the biographical and social data on known terrorists in an attempt to develop some form of terrorist profile. Studies have shown that in general, terrorists are people who often feel alienated from society and have a grievance or regard themselves as victims of an injustice. They are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their violent actions as criminal, showing no pity or remorse for their actions. Although their level of sophistication will vary depending on the individual and the specific terrorist group, terrorists are people who are skillful and ruthless in conducting terrorist acts.[FN 115] [FN 115] Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Pshychology[sic] of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? (Washington: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1999), 50. |
With the source never mentioned, the whole of section III of the source is to be found - mostly word-for-word - in the thesis under scrutiny. This is the starting-point. The source misspells a word in Hudson's book, Nm corrects this word in the bibliography but does not give the year. |
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| [Although their level of] complexity will vary depending on the individual and the specific terrorist group, terrorists are people who are skilled and brutal in leading terrorist acts (Hudson, A. R, 1999). In addition to the above qualities, there are some general characteristics that are equally common among terrorists. There are also some common stereotypes and misconceptions regarding terrorists. | Although their level of sophistication will vary depending on the individual and the specific terrorist group, terrorists are people who are skillful and ruthless in conducting terrorist acts. [FN 115] In addition to the above traits, there are some general characteristics that are fairly common among terrorists. There are also some common stereotypes and misperceptions regarding terrorists.
[FN 115] Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Pshychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? (Washington: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1999), 50. |
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| 2.9.1 Status
Terrorists belong to middle or extremely wealthy background; opposite to common understanding that terrorist are sufferers of poverty and despair. While guerrilla fighters and gang members often come from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds, and may adopt terrorism as a tactic. According to the study conducted by Marc Sageman, a Senior Fellow at PFRI and a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan, out of 400 Islamic terrorists 75% came from the upper or middle class and 90% came from caring, intact families (Sagman, M, 2004). The less educated and socially dispossessed people may be used to conduct acts of terrorism. Even in terrorist groups that espouse the virtues of “the people” or “the proletariat,” leadership consists primarily of those of middle class backgrounds. However, this characteristic must be considered in context with the originating society “Middle class” and “privilege” are relative term. Both mean completely different levels of income between Western Africa and Western Europe. 2.9.2 Education and Intellect Generaly Terrorists are educated to more than average level, except [very few Western terrorists, which are uneducated or illiterate (Hudson, A. R, 1999).] |
[p. 2-12]
Contrary to the oft-repeated charge that terrorism is a product of poverty and despair, terrorists are most commonly from middle class backgrounds, with some actually coming from extreme wealth and privilege. While guerilla fighters and gang members often come from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds, and may adopt terrorism as a tactic, terrorist groups that specifically organize as such generally come from middle and upper social and economic strata. Marc Sageman, a Senior Fellow at PFRI and a former CIA case officer in Afghanistan, conducted a study of 400 Islamic terrorists. He found that 75% came from the upper or middle class and 90% came from caring, intact families. [FN 116] The leadership may use less educated and socially dispossessed people to conduct acts of terrorism. Even in terrorist [FN 116] Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks,” 3. [p. 2-13] groups that espouse the virtues of “the people” or “the proletariat,” leadership consists primarily of those of middle class backgrounds. However, this characteristic must be considered in context with the society the terrorist originates from. “Middle class” or “privilege” are relative terms and will, for example, mean completely different levels of income between Western Africa and Western Europe. Education and Intellect Terrorists in general have more than average education, and very few Western terrorists are uneducated or illiterate.[FN 117] [FN 117] Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, 48. |
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| [Generaly Terrorists are educated to more than average level, except] very few Western terrorists, which are uneducated or illiterate (Hudson, A. R, 1999). Some core members of larger terrorist organizations may have minimal education, but this characteristic is not the standard. Left wing terrorists, international terrorists, and the leadership echelon of right wing groups are usually of average or better intelligence, and have been exposed to advanced education. In fact, terrorist groups are increasingly recruiting members with expertise in areas such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences (Hudson, A. R, 1999). The study of Sageman revealed 63% of his group had gone to college and 75% of those were professionals or semi-professionals (Sagman, M, 2004): For example, Osama Bin Laden is a civil engineer; Ayman Zawahiri is a physician. These terrorists generally have had exposure to higher learning, although they are usually not highly intellectual, and are frequently dropouts or possess poor academic records. Again, this is subject to the norms of the society they originate from. In societies where religious fundamentalism is prevalent, the higher education may have been advanced religious training (Harmon, C. Christopher, 2001).
Domestic and right wing terrorists in general belong to lower educational and social levels, although they are not completely uneducated. The right wing domestic groups in the U.S. first explored the organizational and communication potential of the Internet. They will typically have received a high school level education. They were also well versed and indoctrinated in the ideological arguments they support. 2.9.3 Age Terrorists tend to be young. The terrorists which take part in operations are found to be within age group of 20-35, while the leaders, supporters or training cadres range from 40-50 years old. (Lacquer Walter, 1999). The amount of practical experience and [training that contributes to making an effective operative is not usually present in individuals younger than the early 20s.] |
Terrorists in general have more than average education, and very few Western terrorists are uneducated or illiterate. [FN 117] Some leaders of larger terrorist organizations may have minimal education, but this characteristic is not the norm. Left wing terrorists, international terrorists, and the leadership echelon of right wing groups are usually of average or better intelligence, and have been exposed to advanced education. In fact, terrorist groups are increasingly recruiting members with expertise in areas such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance, and the sciences. [FN 118] The Sageman analysis reflected 63% of his group had gone to college and three-quarters were professionals or semi-professionals. [FN 119] (Usama bin laden a civil engineer; Ayman Zawahiri a physician; and Yasir Arafat was at one time a civil engineer.) These terrorists generally have had exposure to higher learning, although they are usually not highly intellectual, and are frequently dropouts or possess poor academic records. Again, this is subject to the norms of the society they originate from. In societies where religious fundamentalism is prevalent, the higher education may have been advanced religious training. [FN 120]
Domestic and right wing terrorists tend to come from lower educational and social levels, although they are not uneducated. It was right wing domestic groups in the U.S. that first explored the communication and organizational potential of the Internet. They will typically have received a high school level education, and be very well indoctrinated in the ideological arguments they support. Age Terrorists tend to be young. Leadership, support, and training cadres can range into the 40-50 year old age groups, but most operational members of terrorist organizations are in the 20-35 year old age group.[FN 121] The amount of practical experience and training that contributes to making an effective operative is not usually present in individuals younger than the early 20s. [FN 117] Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, 48. [FN 118] Ibid., 4. [FN 119] Marc Sageman, “Understanding Terror Networks,” 3. [FN 120] Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; reprint, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 208. [FN 121] Walter Lacquer, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 38. |
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| [The amount of practical experience and] training that contributes to making an effective operative is not usually present in individuals younger than the early 20s.
Individuals in their teen-age have been employed as soldiers in guerrilla groups, but terrorist organizations usually do not tend to accept extremely young members, although they will use them as non-operational supporters or suicide bombers. Groups that utilize suicide operations will employ very young individuals as suicide assets, but these youths are not actually members of the organization, but are simply exploited or coerced into an operational role (Reich Walter, 1998). Many countries in the developing world subjected to ethnic, political, and religious violence; however, are seeing younger members being recruited by terrorist organizations. Pre-teens and adolescents are often receptive to terrorist recruiting because they have witnessed killings and see violence as the only way to deal with grievances (Hudson, A. R, 1999). |
[p. 2-13]
The amount of practical experience and training that contributes to making an effective operative is not usually present in individuals younger than the early 20s. Individuals in their teens have been employed as soldiers in guerilla groups, but terrorist organizations do not tend to accept extremely young members, although they will use them as non-operational supporters. Groups that utilize suicide operations will employ very young individuals as suicide assets, but these youths are not actually members of the organization, but simply exploited or coerced into an operational role. [FN 122] Many countries in the developing [FN 122] Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 270. [p. 2-14] world subjected to ethnic, political, and religious violence; however, are seeing younger members being recruited by terrorist organizations. Pre-teens and adolescents are often receptive to terrorist recruiting because they have witnessed killings and see violence as the only way to deal with grievances. [FN 123] [FN 123] Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, 48. |
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| 2.9.4 Gender
Terrorists are not exclusively male. Usually Women’s roles will often be constrained to support or intelligence and surveillance work, but some fundamentalist Islamic groups use women in operational roles. In groups where religious constraints do not affect women’s roles, female membership may be above 50%, with women fully integrated into operations. Female leadership of terrorist groups is not uncommon and female terrorists do not lay behind male counterparts in terms of violence and ruthlessness. For example, one-third of the Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadre is made up of women and it is reported that nearly 4,000 have been killed since they began taking part in combat in 1985, over 100 of those killed belonging to the dreaded Black Tiger suicide squad (http://www.eelam.com/ltte). In August 2004, female Chechen suicide bombers were responsible for detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while on [Russian commercial flights that resulted in two aircraft crashes and the death of all people on board.] |
Gender
Terrorists are not exclusively male, even in groups that are rigorously Islamic. Women’s roles in these groups will often be constrained to support or intelligence work, but some fundamentalist Islamic groups use women in operational roles. In groups where religious constraints do not affect women’s roles, female membership may be above fifty percent, with women fully integrated into operations. Female leadership of terrorist groups is not uncommon, and female terrorists lack for nothing in terms of violence and ruthlessness. For example, one-third of the LTTE cadre is made up of women and it is reported that nearly 4,000 have been killed since they began taking part in combat in 1985, over 100 of those killed belonging to the dreaded Black Tiger suicide squad. [FN 125] In August 2004, female Chechen suicide bombers were responsible for detonating IEDs while on Russian commercial flights that resulted in two aircraft crashes and the death of all people on board. [FN 124] 124 “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d., 2; available from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/shrilanka/ terroristoutfits/Ltte.htm; Internet; accessed 7 July 2004. [FN 125] Ibid., 2. |
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| [In August 2004, female Chechen suicide bombers were responsible for detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while on] Russian commercial flights that resulted in two aircraft crashes and the death of all people on board. Within one week, another female Chechen suicide bomber detonated an IED near a metro station in northeast Moscow causing extensive property damage and injuring many people in the area (Alfano, B., 2004). However, female participation and leadership is less common in some right wing groups, particularly those with neo-Nazi and Christian Identity oriented ideologies.
2.9.5 Appearance Terrorist usually do not appear out of the ordinary, and are capable of normal social behaviour and appearance. Thus, terrorists are often unremarkable in individual characteristics. Racial diversity in organizations such as Al Qaeda signal that attempts to racially profile likely terrorist group members is not an effective indicator. Over the long term, elements of fanatical behaviour or ruthlessness may become evident, but they are typically not immediately obvious to casual observation. An excellent example of this is the group 17 November in Greece. When the police captured 14 suspected members in 2002, the most striking characteristic was their ordinary nature. Among the group there was a school teacher, a shopkeeper, a telephone operator, and other members that appeared to be members of mainstream society. Most terrorists do not marry, even though there have been some examples of married couples within terrorist organizations. Although members of sleeper cells or other hidden operators may marry as part of their persona, |
[p. 2-14]
In August 2004, female Chechen suicide bombers were responsible for detonating IEDs while on Russian commercial flights that resulted in two aircraft crashes and the death of all people on board. Within one week, another female Chechen suicide bomber detonated an IED near metro station in northeast Moscow causing extensive property damage and injuring many people in the area. [FN 126] Again, there is an exception to this general observation in some right wing groups, particularly those with neo-Nazi and Christian Identity oriented ideologies. Female participation and leadership is much less common in these groups. Appearance Terrorists are often unremarkable in individual characteristics. Racial diversity in organizations such as al Qaeda signal that attempts to racially profile likely terrorist group members is not an effective indicator. They usually do not appear out of the ordinary, and are capable of normal social behavior and appearance. Over the long term, elements of fanatical behavior or ruthlessness may become evident, but they are typically not immediately obvious to casual observation. An excellent example of this is the group 17 November in Greece. When the police captured 14 suspected members in 2002, the most striking characteristic was their ordinary nature. Among the group were a schoolteacher, a shopkeeper, a telephone operator, and other members that appeared to be members of [FN 126] Billy Alfano, Briefing: “Terrorism Strikes Russia, Summary of the Attacks from August 24 to September 3, 2004,” Department of state, Diplomatic Security, Overseas Security Advisory Council, International Security Specialist for Western Europe, n.d. [p. 2-15] mainstream society. [FN 127] Although members of sleeper cells or other covert operators may marry as part of their persona, most terrorists do not marry, even though there have been cases of married couples within terrorist organizations. [FN 127] “Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N),” CDI Terrorism Project, 5 August 2002; available from http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/17N-pr.cfm; Internet; accessed 24 September 2004. |
continuation from previous page; Nm not only copies word-for-word, but follows exactly the line of argumentation found in the source - thus a passage on "Appearance" follows a passage on "Gender". The last sentence in the sub-chapter ends with a comma that is also found in the source, but the second half of the sentence was not copied. |
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