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| Titel | Harmony and Disharmony - Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities |
| Herausgeber | Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy |
| Ort | West Point, NY, USA |
| Datum | 14. February 2006 |
| Seiten | 116 |
| Anmerkung | An alternative source is the publication: "The Terrorist’s Challenge: Security, Efficiency, Control" by Jacob N. Shapiro (2007) [1] |
| URL | http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21057/Harmony_and_Disharmony-CTC.pdf |
Literaturverz. |
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| Fußnoten | no |
| Fragmente | 2 |
| [1.] Nm/Fragment 146 20 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2012-04-22 20:40:44 Hindemith | Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 146, Zeilen: 20-25 |
Quelle: Combating Terrorism Center 2006 Seite(n): 8, Zeilen: 14-18 |
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| Al Qaeda has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks (Grier P., 2005). Since war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded Osama bin Laden’s command and control, Al Qaeda does appear to have become increasingly decentralized. It is now seen by many as more of a social [movement than coherent organization (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001).] | According to most counterterrorism analysts today, al-Qa’ida has evolved from a centrally directed organization into a worldwide franchiser of terrorist attacks. [FN 7] Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan, which significantly degraded bin Laden’s command and control, al-Qa’ida has become increasingly decentralized, and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization.
[FN 7] Peter Grier, “The New Al Qa’ida: Local Franchiser,” Christian Science Monitor (11 July 2005). Online at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0711/p01s01-woeu.html. |
The source is dated February 14, 2006. According to Nm [FN 22] "parts of this chapter are already published in Memon N., Larsen Henrik Legind 2006c, 2006d, 2007c and Memon N., Qureshi A.R. (2005)." This section appeared in Memon N., Larsen Henrik Legind 2006c in the Proceedings of the second International Conference, ADMA 2006, which was held in August 2006. Thus the unnamed source predates the writing of this section of Nm's thesis. |
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| [2.] Nm/Fragment 147 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-06 20:45:47 Hindemith | BauernOpfer, Combating Terrorism Center 2006, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 147, Zeilen: 1-13 |
Quelle: Combating Terrorism Center 2006 Seite(n): 8, Zeilen: p.8,17-18 and p.9,14-19.20-21.23-24.25-26.26-29 |
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| [It is now seen by many as more of a social] movement than coherent organization (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001).
Al Qaeda did not decide to decentralize until 2002, following the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan and the arrest of a number of key Al Qaeda leaders including Abu Zubaydhah, Al Qaeda’s Dean of students, Ramzi bin Al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg cell of 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, and Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the master mind of the USS Cole attack. In response these and other key losses, Al Qaeda allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council decided that it could no longer operate as a hierarchy, but instead would have to decentralize (Joseph Felter et al., 2005). |
[p. 8]
[...] and is seen by some as more of a “movement” than any other form of organization. [...] [p. 9] Indeed, several years ago al-Qa’ida’s leaders recognized that the achievement of their ultimate goals and objectives required a more decentralized, networked approach. In 2001, following the ouster of the Taliban from Afghanistan, a number of al-Qa’ida leaders suddenly found themselves in detention centers facing long months of interrogation. Abu Zubaydah, al-Qa’ida’s “dean of students,” [...]. Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the organizer of the Hamburg, Germany cell that formed the core of the 9/11 hijackers, [...] Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11 and the financier of the first World Trade Center attack, [...] Tawfiq Attash Kallad, the mastermind of the USS Cole attack, [...] In response to the loss of key leaders, al-Qa’ida allegedly convened a strategic summit in northern Iran in November 2002, at which the group’s consultative council came to recognize that it could no longer exist as a hierarchy, but instead would have to become a decentralized network [...][FN 10] [FN 10] Robert Windrem, 2005. |
In spite of some paraphrasing this remains a collage of various bits and pieces of various lengths from the unnamed source from West Point's Combating Terrorism Center. Nothing is marked as a citation. Both sources, (Wikotorowicz Q., 2001) as well as (Joseph Felter et al., 2005) are not to be found in Nm's list of references. However, "Felter et al. 2005" might refer to a version of the source, as "Joe Felter" led its large team of authors. |
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