Angaben zur Quelle [Bearbeiten]
| Autor | Dov Lynch |
| Titel | The EU: towards a strategy |
| Sammlung | The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU |
| Herausgeber | EU Institute for Security Studies |
| Beteiligte | Pavel Baev, Bruno Coppieters, Svante E. Cornell, David Darchiashvili, Arman Grigorian, Dov Lynch, John Roberts, Domitilla Sagramoso, Brenda Shaffer und Arif Yunusov |
| Ort | Paris |
| Datum | Dezember 2003 |
| Nummer | 65 |
| Seiten | 171-196 |
| Reihe | Chaillot Papers |
| ISSN | 1017-7566 |
| URL | http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp065e.pdf |
Literaturverz. |
nein |
| Fußnoten | ja |
| Fragmente | 8 |
| [1.] Gd/Fragment 057 18 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-18 18:22:27 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 57, Zeilen: 18-23 |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 195, Zeilen: 17-25 |
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| Further more, the states have experienced processes of de-industrialization, large-scale emigration (mainly to Russia) and mass poverty. Georgia and Azerbaijan face severe separatist threats from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and respectively Nagorno-Karabakh inside their borders. These internal weaknesses made these states vulnerable to external insecurity developments. As I have already argued, the region has become a transit zone, as well as, a source of transnational organized crime. | All have experienced processes of de-industrialisation, large-scale emigration (mainly to Russia) and mass poverty. None has developed viable or long-term development projects. Georgia and Azerbaijan face severe separatist threats from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh inside their borders.
These internal weaknesses make these states vulnerable to external insecurity developments. The region has become a transit zone, as well as a source, of transnational organised crime. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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| [2.] Gd/Fragment 058 02 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-07 15:37:40 Schumann | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 193, 194, Zeilen: 193:34-36 - 194:1-6 |
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| Thus, it is not the Union’s objective to extend its exclusive influence in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, but to promote the role of international law in these three states founded on the principles of the UN Charter and state sovereignty. Dov Lynch underlines that “the EU will not act alone, but will seek to support and facilitate the activities of key states and international organizations already active in the region.”93
93 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. pp.193-194 |
[Seite 193]
Nor is the Union’s objective to extend its exclusive influence in the three states. The EU maintains an expanding-sum vision of the future of Armenia, Azerbai- [Seite 194] jan and Georgia and rejects zero-sum approaches. The EU will promote the role of international law in the region, founded on the principles of the UN Charter and state sovereignty. The EU will not act alone, but will seek to support and facilitate the activities of key states and international organisations already active in the region. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. |
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| [3.] Gd/Fragment 060 17 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 20:44:30 Kybot | Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 60, Zeilen: 17-22 |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 172, Zeilen: 29-35 |
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| As Dov Lynch argues: the EU policy towards the South Caucasus is not the result of calculated decisions taken as part of clear policy-making processes; quite the contrary: much of EU thinking and policy is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the region itself, functional to the member state holding the presidency at a particular period, as well as the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery.97
97 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.172 |
One should note from the outset that EU policy towards the South Caucasus is not the result of calculated decisions taken as part of clear policy-making processes; quite the contrary. Much of EU thinking and policy is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the region itself, functional to the member state holding the presidency at a particular period, as well as the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery. |
Grenzwertig, aber als Zitat interpretierbar. |
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| [4.] Gd/Fragment 063 11 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-18 18:23:45 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 63, Zeilen: 11-22, (22-27) |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 166, 181, 182, Zeilen: 166:1-4; 181:23-28.36-40 - 182.1-2.(3-12) |
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| Besides, the European Commission within the framework of the TACIS program supported the creation of a filter system against drug trade from Afghanistan along the old Silk Road.
A Communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus under the PCA of June 1999 identified the conflicts as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and humanitarian problems. In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could only be effective if two conditions were fulfilled: firstly, if the conflicts were settled; and secondly, if regional cooperation became possible. The EC also recognized that the “effectiveness of EC assistance is directly connected to the development of the peace processes”. However, the member states declared that the PCAs offered the best framework for the transformation of the three states. There would be no strategy, and no political role other than that offered by the PCA framework. As Dov Lynch puts it out – “The GAC (General Affairs Council) recognized that EU assistance would be ineffective without conflict settlement, but refused to create a framework that would actually enhance the prospects for the settlement – the PCAs patently not being enough for these purpose. (…) The EU had entered something of a vicious circle, where the correct analysis was being made but there was no political will to act on its conclusions.”102 102 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.182 |
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The European Commission, in the framework of its TACIS regional programme, supports the creation of a ‘filter system’ against drug trade from Afghanistan along the Silk Route. [Seite 181] A Communication on EU relations with the South Caucasus under the PCA of June 1999 identified the conflicts as the root causes of the region’s political, economic and humanitarian problems.23 In the Commission’s view, EU assistance could only be effective if two conditions were fulfilled: if the conflicts were settled and if regional cooperation became possible. [...] [...] The GAC also recognised that the ‘effectiveness of EC assistance is directly connected to the development of the peace processes’. However, the member states declared that the PCAs offered the best framework for the transformation of the three states. There [Seite 182] would be no strategy, and no political role other than that offered by the PCA framework. [...] The GAC recognised that EU assistance would be ineffective without conflict settlement, but refused to create a framework that would actually enhance the prospects for their settlement – the PCAs patently not being enough for this purpose. At the same time, the Council called for an emphasis on greater regional cooperation, an objective that was blocked by the non-settlement of the conflicts. The EU had entered something of a vicious circle, where the correct analysis was being made but there was no political will to act on its conclusions. 23. See ‘Bilateral Relations – South Caucasus’, Bulletin EU 6-1999, 1 March 1998. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. Das Zitat wurde nicht in die Zeilenzählung aufgenommen. |
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| [5.] Gd/Fragment 064 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:52:19 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 64, Zeilen: 1ff (komplett) |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 182, 183, 184, Zeilen: 182:14-36; 183:25-38 - 184:1-7.10-13 |
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| [EU activities in the region included:103]
1. reinforced political dialogue with the three states through the PCA mechanisms, including also EU declarations and statements on developments in and around the region’s conflicts; 2. support to the OSCE in South Ossetia, through EU funding of small-scale rehabilitation programmes on the ground, and the presence of the Commission as an observer in the Joint Control Commission (since April 2001) that runs the Russian-led peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone; 3. some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian occupation and a declared readiness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the case of a settlement between the two parties; 4. support to the Georgian border guards through three Joint Actions, as well as assistance to the OSCE in monitoring sections of the Georgian-Russian border; 5. support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex, jointly controlled by Abkhazia and Georgia. Although these activities are not negligible, EU preferred to stay in a political shadow by not involving itself in peace negotiation processes directly. In early 2001, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat contributed a paper that called for a major review of EU policy to the South Caucasus region. In the first half of 2001, the Swedish presidency set the South Caucasus as one of its priorities. Under this impetus, the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit published its paper on 4 January 2001 and the first ministerial troika visit was made to the capitals of the South Caucasian states in late February 2001. In “Financial Times” on 20 February, was published an article affirming that “the EU cannot afford to neglect the Southern Caucasus”, and pledging a more targeted EU political role to support conflict resolution. The Conclusions of the GAC of 26 February 2001 launched the first phase of a process which ended in July 2003 with the appointment of a Finnish Diplomat as the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. The GAC declared indeed that “the EU is willing to play a more active role in the region … and look for ways in which it can support efforts to push and resolve conflicts and contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation.” However, the idea of raising the level of dialogue with important regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States, was never fulfilled.104 103 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.182 104 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. pp.183-184 |
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After 1999, EU activities in the region included: 1. reinforced political dialogue with the three states through the PCA mechanisms, including also EU declarations and statements on developments in and around the region’s conflicts; 2. support to the OSCE in South Ossetia, through EU funding of small-scale rehabilitation programmes on the ground, and the presence of the Commission as an observer in the Joint Control Commission (since April 2001) that runs the Russian-led peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone; 3. some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian occupation and a declared readiness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the case of a settlement between the two parties; 4. support to the Georgian border guards through three Joint Actions, as well as assistance to the OSCE in monitoring sections of the Georgian-Russian border; 5. support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex, jointly controlled by Abkhazia and Georgia. These activities are not negligible. In all, however, the EU retained a low profile, with little presence as such in the negotiating mechanisms, no direct involvement in mediation, and an undefined overall strategy to lead policy. [Seite 183] Of more direct relevance, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat contributed a paper in early 2001 that called for a major review of EU policy to the region. Crystallising these trends, in the first half of 2001 the Swedish presidency set the South Caucasus as one of its priorities. Under this impetus, the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit published its paper on 4 January 2001. The first ministerial troika visit to the capitals of the region in late February 2001 reflected Sweden’s determination to allocate more time and energy to the question. Chris Patten and the late Anna Lindh published a joint article in the Financial Times on 20 February affirming that ‘the EU cannot afford to neglect the Southern Caucasus’, and pledging a more targeted EU political role to [Seite 184] support conflict resolution.26 The Conclusions of the GAC of 26 February 2001 launched the process whose first phase ended in July 2003 with the appointment of Heikki Talvitie as EU Special Representative.27 The GAC declared indeed that ‘the EU is willing to play a more active role in the region . . . and look for ways in which it can support efforts to push and resolve conflicts as well as in post-conflict rehabilitation.’ [...] However, the idea of raising the level of dialogue with important regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States, was never fulfilled. 26. Financial Times, 20 February 2001. 27. GAC Conclusions (Brussels, 26/27 February 2001, 6506/01 Press 61). |
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| [6.] Gd/Fragment 068 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:53:57 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 68, Zeilen: 1-4 |
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| [Moreover, a greater degree of communication can be expected between] the member states and the EU. The CFSP High Representative and the EU Special Representative can play a bridging role in this respect. The EU will only be able to exploit the tool of conditionality in relations with the three states, if the Union itself is better coordinated and targeted. | Moreover, a greater degree of communication can be expected between member states and the EU. The CFSP High Representative and the Special Representative can play a bridging role in this respect. The EU will only be able to exploit the tool of conditionality with the three states if the Union itself is better coordinated and targeted. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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| [7.] Gd/Fragment 081 20 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:53:05 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 81, Zeilen: 20-32 |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 173, 174, 191, Zeilen: 173:32-37 - 174:1-10 191:14-17 |
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| The enlarged EU has new borders with Belarus, Ukraine, Russia (as a consequence of the 2004 enlargement), Moldova and the Black Sea (after the 2007 enlargement). These new borders have brought EU a new obligation of thinking about the states on its periphery and the policies that should be developed in response to potential and actual threats emerging from these regions. One more reason why a new policy should be drafted was the fact that the PCA approach applied to the former Soviet republics was not good enough to promote EU political interests. So, the EU has started to rethink policy towards the states on its new borders. During the 90s and in the first years of the beginning of 21st century, the European Union’s foreign policy was unskilled. In case the membership prospect was not granted to a country, the EU had nearly no other strategy for relations with the latter. In 2003, the Commission’s “Wider Europe” Communication reflects an attempt to develop policies towards states where the EU has significant interests but where membership is not a prospect. | [Seite 173]
Second, the enlarged EU will have new borders, immediately with Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, and at some time after 2007 with Moldova and the Black Sea. These new borders also bring a new immediacy to EU thinking about the states on its periphery and the policies that should be adopted in response to potential and actual threats emerging from these regions. [Seite 174] Third, partly in response to these pressures, the EU has started to rethink policy towards the states on its new borders. For much for the 1990s, EU ‘foreign policy’ – if this is the appropriate term – revolved around the question of membership/non-membership: if membership was on the cards, then the EU had a fully developed policy towards a given state; if it was not, then the EU had little policy at all. This is changing. The Commission’s ‘Wider Europe’ Communication reflects an attempt to develop policies towards states where the EU has significant interests but where membership is not a prospect for now. [Seite 191] Second, the blanket PCA approach applied to the former Soviet republics in the mid-1990s will not be enough to assist the transformation of these states or to promote EU political interests. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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| [8.] Gd/Fragment 082 02 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-02-22 17:15:24 Schumann | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Division of the member states over the Iraqi war, mentioned previously, was a bad proof for the CFSP, but on the other hand, the Iraqi crisis stimulated thinking on the development of an EU Security Strategy drafted by Mr. Javier Solana. A major point made in the Security Strategy is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries around the European Union.
On 11 March 2003, the European Commission published its Communication “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. As I already previously examined, the South Caucasus states were a footnote in the Communication: “Given their location, the Southern Caucasus therefore also falls outside the geographic scope of this initiative for the time being.” But later, in June 2004, the three South Caucasian states, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were rescued from obscurity in the draft EU Security Strategy approved at the Thessaloniki summit. The draft Strategy, entitled as “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, outlined the Union’s strategic circumstances, the variegated nature of threats facing the Union and the policies that must be considered in response. In the section on “Extending the Zone of Security around Europe”, the EU Strategy states: “We should take a stronger interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which in due course will also be a neighbouring region.”138 138 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.171 |
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On 11 March 2003, the European Commission published its Communication ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, which launched a debate about EU policy towards its new neighbours.2 The South Caucasus was a footnote in the Communication: ‘Given their location, the Southern Caucasus therefore also falls outside the geographic scope of this initiative for the time being.’ Then, in June 2003, the three South Caucasian states, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were rescued from obscurity in the draft EU Security Strategy, written by Javier Solana and approved at the Thessaloniki summit.3 The draft Strategy, entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, outlined the Union’s strategic circumstances, the variegated nature of threats facing the Union and the policies that must be considered in response. In the section on ‘Extending the Zone of Security around Europe’, the EU Strategy states: ‘We should take a stronger interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which in due course will also be a neighbouring region.’ [Seite 174] More widely, the Iraqi crisis stimulated thinking on the development of an EU Security Strategy, drafted by Javier Solana. A major point made in the Security Strategy is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries on the EU’s borders. 2. ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Commission Communication COM(203), 104 final, Brussels, 11 March 2003. 3. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, paper presented by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Council, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003; http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. |
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