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| Titel | Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU's Role |
| Herausgeber | International Crisis Group |
| Ort | Tbilisi/Brüssel |
| Datum | 20. März 2006 |
| Nummer | 173 |
| Reihe | Europe Report |
| URL | http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/173_conflict_resolution_south_caucasus.ashx |
Literaturverz. |
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| Fußnoten | nein |
| Fragmente | 13 |
| [1.] Gd/Fragment 063 05 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:11:34 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Since 1999, EU funds have mainly gone to support PCA implementation. The TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIP) 2004-2005 prioritized support for institutional, legal and administrative reform and addressing the social consequences of transition and economic development. Between 1992 and 2004 TACIS national allocations were €111 million in Georgia, €123 million in Azerbaijan and €99 million in Armenia. Funds from the European Agriculture Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) in 1992-2004 totalled €62 million in Georgia, €65 million in Azerbaijan and €50 million in Armenia.101
101 International Crisis Group – Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role. Europe Report No.173, 20 March 2006. p.5 |
Since 1999 EU funds have mainly gone to support PCA implementation. The TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIP) 2004-2005 prioritised support for institutional, legal and administrative reform and addressing the social consequences of transition and economic development.51 Between 1992 and 2004 TACIS national allocations were €111 million in Georgia,52 €123 million in Azerbaijan53 and €99 million in Armenia.54 Funds from the European Agriculture Guarantee and Guidance Fund (EAGGF) in 1992-2004 totalled €62 million in Georgia,55 €65 million in Azerbaijan56 and €50 million in Armenia.57
51 European Commission, “TACIS National Indicative Program for Armenia 2004-2006”, adopted 18 September 2003. 52 Commission Staff Working Paper, op. cit., p. 8. 53 Information provided by the Europa House Information Point, Baku, February 2006. 54 “European Union-Armenia Cooperation Report 2004”, o. cit. 55 Commission Staff Working Paper, op. cit., p.8. 56 Information provided by the Europa House Information Point, Baku, February 2006. 57 EU’s Relations with Armenia, “Country Profile: Armenia”, at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/armenia/intro/. |
Obwohl identisch, bleiben Art und Umfang der Übernahme ungekennzeichnet. |
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| [2.] Gd/Fragment 065 19 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:12:16 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| As Crisis Group indicates, impressed by the reformist rhetoric of President Saakashvili’s new administration, the EU expressed firm political support for stability and reform in the country. In June 2004, the Commission pledged nearly 1 billion USD. On 2 July 2004, the Commission made available €4.65 million under its Rapid Reaction Mechanism for measures to reinforce the rule of law and democratic processes; and at the request of Georgian authorities the Council launched the ESDP rule of law mission to help address urgent challenges in the criminal justice system. The new EU projects were partly conflict prevention measures – efforts to solidify the revolution’s foundations and combat risks of destabilization. They also complemented existing TACIS programs supporting institutional, legal and administrative reforms.106
106 International Crisis Group – Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role. Europe Report No.173, 20 March 2006. p.5-6 |
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Impressed by the reformist rhetoric of President Saakashvili’s new administration, the EU agreed to early support.59 The Council made three statements within three months in 2003-2004 expressing firm political support for stability and reform in Georgia.60 The Commission took the lead in organising a June 2004 donors conference during which pledges of nearly $1 billion61 were made.62 On 2 July 2004 the Commission made available €4.65 million under its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for measures to [Seite 6] reinforce the rule of law and democratic processes,63 and at the request of Georgian authorities the Council launched the ESDP rule of law mission to help address urgent challenges in the criminal justice system.64 The new EU projects were partly conflict prevention measures – efforts to solidify the revolution’s foundations and combat risks of destabilisation. They also complemented existing TACIS programs supporting institutional, legal and administrative reforms.65 59 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions, 26 January 2004, at: http://europa.eu.int/ comm/external_relations/georgia/intro/gac.htm#geo260104. 60 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council Conclusions, 17 November 2003, 9 December 2003 and 26 January 2004, at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/georgia/intro/gac.htm#geo260104. 61 Figures denoted in dollars ($) in this report refer to U.S. dollars. 62 European Commission and World Bank, “International donors give extraordinary support to Georgia: approx $1 billion/ €850 million pledged”, Joint Press Release, Brussels, 16 June 2004, at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ relations/ georgia/ intro/press170604.pdf. 63 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/georgia/intro/ip 04_846.htm. Funds were allocated to projects in four areas: penitentiary and probation service reform, organisational reform of the ministry of justice and other public institutions, parliamentary and electoral reform, and confidence building among population groups affected by conflict. 64 Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP, “on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS”, 28 June 2004. EUJUST Themis terminated on 15 July 2005, after which and until March 2006, when the lead went to the Commission, the EUSR had a responsibility to follow up implementation of the reform strategy (Joint Action 2005/582/CFSP of 28 July 2005). 65 The EU supported has democratisation and human rights in Georgia since the early 1990s. This has not been so in Armenia and Azerbaijan. NGOs from all three countries can, nevertheless, apply for European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) funds. |
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| [3.] Gd/Fragment 066 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:13:22 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Somewhat surprisingly, the Commission changed its mind very quickly and recommended Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to enter the newly drafted ENP in June 2004. More to that point, in September 2004, the President (by that time) of the European Commission Romano Prodi paid a ground-breaking visit to the South Caucasus. | It was not until after the European Security Strategy had been adopted in December 200311 that the Commission changed its mind and recommended that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia take part.12 They were offered inclusion in the ENP in June 2004, and in September 2004 the then-President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, paid a ground-breaking visit. |
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| [4.] Gd/Fragment 070 09 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 22:13:23 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| So far, the UN and the OSCE have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement. Yet, more than a decade of negotiations led by the UN in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have failed to produce negotiated settlements. Ceasefires have been signed, but gunfire is still exchanged. There are dozens of fatalities each year, including recent (summer 2008) escalations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which grew into the broader Russia-Georgian armed confrontation.
[...] The European Union can offer added value to the efforts of the UN and OSCE. It has at its disposal political and economic instruments to provide incentives and apply conditionality on conflicting parties if it chooses to become more directly involved in ongoing negotiations. |
So far the UN and the OSCE have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement, yet more than a decade of negotiations led by the UN in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have failed to produce negotiated settlements.14 Ceasefires have been signed but gunfire is still exchanged, especially on the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire line, where there are dozens of fatalities each year. The EU, generally more comfortable with a post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building role, has been wary of becoming directly involved in conflict resolution. Yet, it can offer added value to the efforts of the UN and OSCE. It has at its disposal political and economic instruments to provide incentives and apply conditionality on conflicting parties if it chooses to become more directly involved in ongoing negotiations.
14 The Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz officials in Moscow in May 1994; the Sochi Agreement was signed by Presidents Shevardnadze and Yeltsin in June 1992, establishing a ceasefire in South Ossetia; a ceasefire was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh parties in May 1994. |
Kein Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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| [5.] Gd/Fragment 073 05 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 17:00:44 Schumann | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| The TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIPs) 2004-2006 for the two countries prioritize support for institutional, legal and administrative reform and address the social consequences of transition and economic development. For some reasons, projects in the politically sensitive fields of judiciary and law enforcement reform, civil society development and human rights were not defined as areas of cooperation.
As the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is concerned, the NIPs stated the following: the Azerbaijani NIP – “EU accords very high priority to measures which can both a) underpin a peace settlement b) and prepare Azerbaijan to derive maximum benefit from the ending of the conflict”. The Armenian NIP – “the EU/EC shall…continue to follow closely…developments on the peace process… including with a view to support efforts to resolve the conflict as well as in post-conflict rehabilitation. Support to key infrastructure sectors, especially in the energy and transport sectors…. De-mining actions will also form an element of reconstruction programs in order to ensure restoration of normal living and working conditions”. |
The TACIS National Indicative Programs (NIPs) for the two countries, 2004-2006, prioritise support for institutional, legal and administrative reform and addressing the social consequences of transition and economic development.66 For some reason, projects in the politically sensitive fields of judiciary and law enforcement reform, civil society development and human rights were not defined as areas of cooperation.67 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was at least mentioned: the Azerbaijani NIP stated that the “EU accords very high priority to measures which can both a) underpin a peace settlement b) and prepare Azerbaijan to derive maximum benefit from the ending of the conflict”.68 The Armenian NIP provided that “the EU/EC shall…continue to follow closely…developments on the peace process… including with a view to support efforts to resolve the conflict as well as in post-conflict rehabilitation. Support to key infrastructure sectors, especially in the energy and transport sectors…. De-mining actions will also form an element of reconstruction programs in order to ensure restoration of normal living and working conditions”.69
66 European Commission, TACIS National Indicative Programme for Armenia 2004-2006, Adopted 18 September 2003. 67 As they are in Georgia. European Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006 and TACIS National Indicative Programme 2004-2006, Georgia, adopted 23 September 2003, pp.26-32. Recently the Commission started a judicial reform project in Azerbaijan for €2.8 million to assist the penitentiary system, bailiffs and the usher service. It also plans to start an “integrated border management and combat trafficking in persons” project worth €2 million. Local NGOs in Azerbaijan complain about EU lack of interest in their work. Crisis Group interview, director of the Democracy, Human Rights and Media Monitor, Baku, January 2006. Crisis Group interview, chairwoman of the Bureau for Human Rights and Legal Defence, Baku, January, 2006. 68 European Commission, TACIS National Indicative Programme for Azerbaijan 2004-2006, adopted 22 May 2003. p. 4. 69 European Commission, TACIS National Indicative Programme for Armenia 2004-2006, adopted 18 September 2003, p. 2. |
Die Quelle ist nicht genannt. Die gekennzeichneten wörtlichen Zitate weisen identische Auslassungen auf. |
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| [6.] Gd/Fragment 073 25 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 17:01:37 Schumann | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| The International Crisis Group argues that Azerbaijan sees European integration as part of its broader regional agenda based on oil and gas resource extraction and distribution. A growing self-confidence based on high expectations of oil wealth encourages some elites to wonder – “if we have oil, do we still need Europe?” But, on the other hand, there are still some people within governmental as well as non governmental structures who believe that their country may be losing a historic opportunity to move closer to Europe along with its South Caucasus neighbours and risks drifting towards a Central Asian type relationship with Brussels instead. | Azerbaijan sees European integration as part of its broader regional agenda based on oil and gas resource extraction and distribution. This is likely to become more evident as Turkey approaches EU membership.76 A growing self-confidence based on high expectations of oil wealth encourages some elites to wonder, “if we have oil, do we still need Europe?”77 Yet some working within government and non-governmental structures expressed concern to Crisis Group that their country may be losing an historic opportunity to move closer to Europe along with its South Caucasus neighbours and risks drifting towards a Central Asian-type relationship with Brussels instead.78
76 Rza Ibadov, Azerbaijan and the European Union Neighbourhood Policy: Building a Privileged Relationship (London, 2005), p. 27. Several Azerbaijani researchers argued Azerbaijan would be easier to integrate into Europe because it had a more Europeanised political culture and smaller population than Turkey. Crisis Group interviews, Baku, January 2006. 77 Crisis Group interviews, local and international informants, Baku, February 2006. 78 Crisis Group interviews, Azerbaijan government official and NGOs, Baku, February 2006. |
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| [7.] Gd/Fragment 078 06 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 17:08:33 Schumann | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| With his new mandate, Mr. Semneby could try to participate directly in the conflict resolution negotiations. This is most likely to happen in the scope of the South Ossetian conflict solving process as Georgia has already invited the EUSR to participate in the procedure. For Tbilisi, the inclusion of the EUSR in the aforementioned process would help in changing existing negotiation formats, which is, following the Georgian perception, outdated after a decade of fruitless talks. The EUSR cou1d join the JCC132 either as an observer or a full participant or even take the lead in creating a new format based on direct talks between Georgia, South Ossetia and perhaps Russia.
132 The Joint Control Commission is a negotiating body to the South Ossetian conflict and consists of the following parties: Georgia, Russia, self proclaimed South Ossetian authorities and OSCE representatives. |
With his new mandate, however, he could try to participate directly in conflict resolution negotiations.251 This is most likely in the context of the South Ossetian conflict, as Georgia has already invited the EUSR,252 unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Tbilisi, inclusion of the EUSR would mark significant progress towards changing existing negotiation formats, which it considers biased and outdated after a decade of fruitless talks. The EUSR could join the JCC either as an observer or a full participant or take the lead in creating a new format based on direct talks with Georgia, South Ossetia and perhaps Russia.
251 As a rapidly growing donor, the U.S. might also become interested in being involved in the negotiation format as an observer. 252 Prime Minister Nogaideli, letter to Solana, op. cit. |
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| [8.] Gd/Fragment 086 23 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 17:16:03 Schumann | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| In 2005-2006, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia entered dialogues with the EU to prepare country-specific cross-pillar Action Plans, which were aimed at building mutual commitment to common values and provide a point of reference for future programming under the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)148.
148 A specific and innovative feature of the ENPI is its cross border cooperation component. Under this component, the ENPI will finance “joint programs” bringing together regions of Members States and partner countries sharing a common border. The financial reference amount for implementation of the Regulation over the period 2007-2013 is € 14.929 million for 17 partner states – members of the ENP, including the Caucasus. ENPI names both state and non-state actors, such as NGOs, local communities, municipalities, trade unions, universities, religious associations and other, who can contribute to the development, as eligible for the assistance. The mechanism and distribution of assistance as well as correlation of financial support among the state and non - state actors will have a significant impact on the success of reforms in all three South Caucasus states. See Alieva Leila – EU and South Caucasus. Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research. CAP Discussion Paper, December 2006.p.8 |
In 2005-2006 Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia entered dialogues with the EU to prepare country-specific, cross-pillar Action Plans,87 which are aimed at building mutual commitment to common values and provide a point of reference for future programming, especially under the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).88
87 By end 2005, ENP Action Plans had been formally adopted with Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine. Negotiations were ongoing with Egypt and Lebanon as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The seven existing Action Plans mostly focus on political dialogue and reform; economic and social development; regulatory and trade-related issues; justice and home affairs; sectoral issues; and people-to-people contacts. The Maastricht Treaty 1992 established three pillars, forming the basic structure of the EU: the Community dimension, covering economic, social and environmental policies (first pillar); the common foreign and security policy (second pillar); and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (third pillar). The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred policies related to the free movement of persons from the third to the first pillar. 88 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, COM (2004), 628 final, Brussels, 29 September 2004. The ENPI regulation and its implementing rules have yet to be adopted. ENPI is supposed to be operational by 2007. |
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| [9.] Gd/Fragment 087 04 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 22:17:52 Schumann | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| The EU has pledged that successful fulfilment of the Action Plan can lead to further deve1opment of bilateral relations, including new contractual links in the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements.
Following the Crisis Group evaluation – the Action Plans risk becoming sole technical documents, which do little to strengthen genuine political ties. Besides, the potential of Action Plans to promote conflict resolution has not been fully exploited. According to the original strategy, the ENP was to “reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution” and to strengthen “the EU’s contribution to promote the settlement of regional conflicts”. However, by reviewing the South Caucasus plans, there is nothing to find concerning concrete steps for conflict resolution, but the latter is included as one of many priorities under “political dialogue and reform”. The focus is made on trade relations and economic and political change. An exception is the AP of Moldova in which a viable solution to the Transdniestria conflict is defined as a key priority and seven steps are elaborated.149 In its 2005 recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Commission restricted its commitment to conflict resolution, stating that the Action Plans should offer “further support for economic rehabilitation of the conflict zones in the context of conflict settlement”. [...] As a consequence, Georgian sources expressed frustration that the EU was unwilling to incorporate more conflict resolution commitments in the action plan. 149 International Crisis Group – Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role. Europe Report No.173, 20 March 2006. p.8 |
The EU has pledged that successful fulfilment of the Action Plan can lead to further development of bilateral relations, including new contractual links in the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements.89
[...] In reality, the plans risk becoming long-winded technical documents which do little to strengthen genuine political ties. [...] The potential of Action Plans to promote conflict resolution has not been fully exploited. According to the original strategy, the ENP was to “reinforce stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict resolution” and to strengthen “the EU’s contribution to promoting the settlement of regional conflicts”.91 However, a brief review of the existing seven shows that conflict resolution has largely fallen by the wayside, just one of many priorities under “political dialogue and reform”. The focus is on trade relations and economic and political change.92 An exception is the Moldova plan in which a viable solution to the Transdniestria conflict is defined as a key priority and seven steps are elaborated.93 [...] In its 2005 recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Commission restricted its commitment to conflict resolution, stating Action Plans should offer “further support for economic rehabilitation of the conflict zones in the context of conflict settlement”.95 [Seite 9] Georgian sources expressed frustration that the EU was unwilling to incorporate more conflict resolution commitments in the text.100 89 Content and scope still has to be defined. European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, op. cit., pp.3-4. 91 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, Strategy Paper, op. cit., pp.4, 6. 92 Ferrero-Waldner, “Implementing and Promoting the European Neighbourhood Policy”, op. cit., p.11. 93 Proposed EU/Moldova Action Plan, at: http://europa.eu.int/ comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Moldova.pdf. 95 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy: Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon”, Communication to the Council, COM (2005), 72 final, Brussels, 2 March 2005. This restricted contribution to conflict resolution is at least partially to be explained by the fact that the Commission generally focuses on economic rehabilitation projects while more “hard-power” and political crisis management is the prerogative of the Council. 100 Crisis Group interview, official, ministry of foreign affairs, Tbilisi, March 2006 |
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| As already mentioned previously, Tbilisi wants the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts to be the first priority in the Action Plan. Tbilisi considers integration into the Europe to be a key factor for resolving its conflicts and assumes that cooperation with the EU will be based only on respect of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders”. It seeks EU support for implementing the Georgian peace plans for settlement of the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and would like the Action Plan to include more instruments from the ESDP toolbox promoting regional stability and crisis management. Georgia appreciates the economic rehabilitation assistance the EU provides in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but declares that this kind of help should be supplemented by greater political and military engagement. Thus, Tbilisi seeks direct EU political participation in the settlement of the conflicts, which it considers to be unresolved primarily because of Russian ambiguous meddling; and believes that the EU could exercise a positive influence on Russia to make its role more constructive. | Tbilisi wants the “peaceful resolution of internal conflicts” to be the first priority in its Action Plan.103 Detailed measures to increase “cooperation for the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts” are elaborated upon in the draft “Elements for Inclusion”, proposed to Brussels in December 2005, since Tbilisi considers integration into Europe a key factor for resolving its conflicts.104 Georgia is lobbying for a pledge that cooperation with the EU will based on respect of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders”. It seeks EU support for implementing the Georgian “peace plan for settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia”, including assistance in demilitarisation, confidence building, and economic development,105 and would like the Action Plan to include more instruments from the ESDP toolbox to promote regional stability and crisis management. Georgia is appreciative of the economic rehabilitation assistance the EU provides in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflict zones106but clearly feels that this kind of help should be supplemented by greater political and military security-related engagement.107
[...] It seeks direct EU political participation in the settlement of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz conflicts, which it considers to be unresolved primarily because of Russian meddling, and believes the EU “can have a positive influence on Russia [Seite 10] to make its role more constructive”.108 103 “Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan”, amended draft 20 December 2005, p.3. In earlier versions, peaceful resolution of the conflicts was not identified as a primary priority, though it was included. Crisis Group interview, former official, Georgian ministry of foreign affairs, Tbilisi, December 2005. 104 Addressing the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee in Brussels, Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvilil explained, “the most serious impediment for the consolidation of democracy and economic development in Georgia has been internal so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. [The] existence of conflicts poses a major threat to the security and development of not only Georgia, but is detrimental to democracy, security, and stability in the South Caucasus region as a whole.” Ahto Lobjakas, “Georgia lobbies for EU backing in standoffs with Russia”, RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 27 January 2006. 105 As proposed in the “Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan”, amended draft, 20 December 2005. For more, see Section IV below. 106 See Section III below. 107 Crisis Group interview, official, Office of the State Minister of Georgia on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Tbilisi, December 2005. 108 Giorgi Baramidze, Georgian State Minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, talking points for a meeting with Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, May 2005, at http://www.eu-integration.gov.ge/eng/speeches. php. |
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| To some degree like Georgia, Armenia initially used its June 2005 “Framework proposal for its Action Plan” to ask the EU help addressing some of the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It called for assistance in maintaining and strengthening the regime of ceasefire in the zone of the conflict and to work towards exclusively peaceful conflict settlement taking into account the right of people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination. Besides, Armenia has requested the EU to refrain from funding any regional projects that increase its isolation and is looking forward to Brussels to encourage Ankara to open the borders with Armenia seeking to normalize relations. | To some degree like Georgia, Armenia initially used its June 2005 “Framework proposal for its Action Plan” to ask that the EU help address some of the consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It called for assistance in “maintaining and strengthening the regime of ceasefire” in the zone of the conflict and “to work towards exclusively peaceful conflict settlement taking into account the right of people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination”.124 [...] Armenia has requested the EU to refrain from funding any regional projects that increase its isolation126 and has generally found a sympathetic ear when promoting the virtues of regional cooperation. It also seeks political support to help resolve its conflicts with Turkey, looking to Brussels to encourage Ankara to open the borders with Armenia,127 normalise relations and play a constructive role on Nagorno-Karabakh.128
124 “Framework Proposal for ENP Armenia Action Plan”, 15 June 2005. 126 During her visit to Armenia on 17 February 2006, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner called economic integration in the South Caucasus a necessary condition for regional stability. She confirmed EU opposition to plans by Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to build a regional railway bypassing Armenia. “A railway project that is not including Armenia will not get our financial support”. Anna Saghabalian, “EU Signals More Attention to Political Reform in Armenia”, RFE/RL, Armenialiberty, 17 February 2006, http://www.armenialiberty. org/armeniareport/report/en/2006/02/84CE2183-237B-4641-92EE-899C68818D0B.asp. 127 Framework Proposal for ENP Armenia Action Plan, op. cit., requested “EU assistance in reopening Kars-Gyumri railway”. 128 Crisis Group interviews, officials, ministry of foreign affairs, Yerevan, January-February 2006. On Turkey, see for example, European Parliament, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, text adopted 19 January 2006, Strasbourg, point 68. |
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| [12.] Gd/Fragment 090 31 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2016-03-06 17:32:04 Schumann | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 90, Zeilen: 31-33 |
Quelle: International Crisis Group 2006 Seite(n): 12, Zeilen: l. Spalte: 3ff |
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| Only the following specific actions are indicated in the AP in order to contribute to the peaceful resolution of the conflict: increased diplomatic efforts; continued support for a peaceful solution; and increased support for the OSCE Minsk Group negotiation process. [Other sections refer to promoting sustained efforts for peace as well as aid for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, but the language is even weaker than that in the Georgian AP.] | Only four specific actions are intended to “contribute to the peaceful solution of the conflict”: increased diplomatic efforts; continued support for a peaceful solution; and increased support for the OSCE Minsk Group negotiation process; and likewise for people-to-people contacts. Other sections of the drafts refer to promoting sustained efforts for peace, de-mining, aid for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and promoting the active involvement of civil society,133 but the language is even weaker than in the draft offered to Georgia.
133 Draft Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Armenia ENP Action Plan”, 28 December 2005, and “Draft Elements for Inclusion in an EU/Azerbaijan ENP Action Plan”, 23 February 2006. In the Azerbaijani draft these actions are highlighted, meaning they remain under discussion. The Armenian Action Plan points have been agreed. |
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| [13.] Gd/Fragment 092 24 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-11-25 05:34:36 Hindemith | Fragment, Gd, International Crisis Group 2006, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 92, Zeilen: 24-30 |
Quelle: International Crisis Group 2006 Seite(n): 14, Zeilen: 6ff |
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| They submitted an “alternative” Action Plan proposal to the Commission delegation in Tbilisi and in Brussels. It was a tactic step from few representatives of the Georgian civil society in order to participate in Action Plan preparation processes. As a consequence, five representatives were invited to sit on the special commission set up by presidential decree to draft the Action Plan. Besides, NGOs were included in information sharing meetings with the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. | A Georgian civil society coalition submitted an “alternative” Action Plan to the Commission delegation in Tbilisi and in Brussels.152 The initial idea was not to propose an “alternative” but the coalition adopted the tactic when it felt excluded from the official process.153 Five civil society representatives were invited to sit on the special commission set up by presidential decree to draft the Action Plan.154 But the commission met only four times in 2005 and served purely as a consultative body. NGOs were included in information-sharing meetings with the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
152 Some 70 Georgian NGOs, divided into five working groups and funded by the Open Society-Georgia Foundation, Eurasia Foundation and Heinrich Böll Foundation, worked on this document, “Recommendations on Georgia’s Action Plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy”. It can be viewed at: http://osgf.ge/miscdocs/eu/ ENG-ENP-Action-Plan-NGO-Recomm.doc. 153 Crisis Group interview with Tinatin Khidasheli, former chair of the Open Society-Georgia Foundation board, February 2006. 154 Civil society was particularly critical of early Action Plan drafts prepared by the government which included no mention of human rights, conflict, or minority issues. They disapprove of the drafting process, which they feel lacked transparency. Some NGO representatives complained drafts were shared with them only after they had been discussed with Brussels. Crisis Group interview, member of the government commission, February 2006. |
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