von Nasrullah Memon
Statistik und Sichtungsnachweis dieser Seite findet sich am Artikelende
| [1.] Nm/Fragment 060 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2014-03-06 15:33:54 WiseWoman | DCSINT 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and similar direct actors in terrorism and violent plans. | Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and similar direct action terrorists in an attack. |
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| [2.] Nm/Fragment 060 05 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2012-04-16 20:54:57 Hindemith | DCSINT 2005, Fragment, Gesichtet, Nm, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| • Leaders design organizational policy and provide directions. They approve goals and objectives and provide management and guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of any given organization, or create their own organization from scratch. | • Leaders provide direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and provide overarching guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of any given organization, or create their own organization from scratch. |
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| Terrorist groups will recruit from the population having sympathy to their goals. Often legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. For example: Militant Islamic recruiting is often associated with the proliferation of the radical Wahhabi sect. The recruitment takes place via Wahhabist schools worldwide, financed from both governmental and private donations and grants (Corpus N. Victor, 2002). In the time of need, particular skills or qualification is also considered during recruitment. Of particular concern are attempts of terrorist organizations to recruit current or former members of the armed forces, both as trained operatives, and as agents in place.
Recruitment can gain operatives from many diverse social backgrounds. At times, the approach to radical behaviour or direct actions with terrorism can develop over the course of years or decades. One example is John Walker Lindh. Lindh was the U.S. citizen, captured by U.S. military forces during the war in Afghanistan. His notoriety jumped into international attention, as did the situation of individuals from several counties that were apprehended in combat actions of Afghanistan. Lindh was changed from an unassuming middle-class adolescent in the Western United States to a member of a paramilitary training camp in Pakistan and his subsequent support for Taliban forces in Afghanistan spotlights that general profiling should be tempered with specific instances [and a broad perspective.] |
[p. 3-2]
Terrorist groups will recruit from populations that are sympathetic to their goals. Often legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. Militant Islamic recruiting, for example, is often associated with the proliferation of the radical Wahhabi sect. This recruiting is conducted on a worldwide basis via Wahhabist schools financed from both governmental and non-governmental donations and grants. [FN 128] Some recruiting may be conducted for particular skills and qualifications, and not be tied to ideological characteristics. Of particular concern are attempts of terrorist organizations to recruit current or former members of the U.S. armed forces, both as trained operatives, and as agents in place. [FN 128] Victor N. Corpus, “The Invisible Army” (Briefing presented at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2002), TRADOC ADCSINT-Threats Files, Fort Leavenworth, KS. [p. 3-3] Recruitment can gain operatives from many diverse social backgrounds. At times, the approach to radical behavior or direct actions with terrorism can develop over the course of years or decades. One example is John Walker Lindh, the U.S. citizen captured by U.S. military forces in the war in Afghanistan. His notoriety jumped into international attention, as did the situation of individuals from several counties that were apprehended in combat actions of Afghanistan. Lindh’s change from an unassuming middle-class adolescent in the Western United States to a member of a paramilitary training camp in Pakistan and subsequent support for Taliban forces in Afghanistan spotlights that general profiling should be tempered with specific instances and a broad perspective. |
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