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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 108, Zeilen: 1-4 |
Quelle: Gaddis 1982 Seite(n): 68, 374, Zeilen: 68:33-39 |
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| Acheson was persuaded by these arguments enough that he favored the continuation of trade in non-strategic items with the mainland and opposed aiding Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, despite the fact that such aid would have been in line with the “defense perimeter” strategy.45
45 NSC 41 , draft report on “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” February 28, 1949, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume IX (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972-1976), pp. 826-34; also Acheson statement at National Security Council meeting, March 1, 1949, ibid, pp. 295-96. |
Acheson found these arguments convincing—so much so that in order to avoid doing anything that might drive the Chinese Communists to align themselves permanently with the Russians he favored allowing the continuation of trade in non-strategic items with the mainland and opposed aiding Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, despite the fact that such aid would have been consistent with the strategy of defending island strongholds.40
[page 374] 40. NSC 41, draft report on “United States Policy Regarding Trade with China,” February 28, 1949, FR: 1949, IX, 826-34; Acheson statement at National Security Council meeting, March 1, 1949, ibid., pp. 295-96; Acheson executive session testimony, October 12, 1949, SFRC Hearings: Reviews of the World Situation, pp. 97-98; Acheson memorandum of conversation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 29, 1949, FR: 1949, 465-67. |
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