6 ungesichtete Fragmente: "verdächtig" oder "Keine Wertung"
[1.] Gd/Fragment 060 17 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 16. December 2013, 20:44 (Kybot) Erstellt: 7. October 2013, 21:17 Graf Isolan | Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 60, Zeilen: 17-22 |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 172, Zeilen: 29-35 |
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As Dov Lynch argues: the EU policy towards the South Caucasus is not the result of calculated decisions taken as part of clear policy-making processes; quite the contrary: much of EU thinking and policy is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the region itself, functional to the member state holding the presidency at a particular period, as well as the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery.97
97 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.172 |
One should note from the outset that EU policy towards the South Caucasus is not the result of calculated decisions taken as part of clear policy-making processes; quite the contrary. Much of EU thinking and policy is the result of contingent circumstances, the pull of events from the region itself, functional to the member state holding the presidency at a particular period, as well as the role of strong individuals inside the EU machinery. |
Grenzwertig, aber als Zitat interpretierbar. |
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[2.] Gd/Fragment 158 04 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 27. November 2014, 23:24 (Hindemith) Erstellt: 22. December 2013, 19:26 Graf Isolan | Attinà 2004, Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 158, Zeilen: 4-15 |
Quelle: Attinà 2004 Seite(n): 19, 20, Zeilen: 19:44-48; 20:2-9 |
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As Attina argues, the European security partnership has been put many times to a test, but unfortunately, performance has not been always good. However, there are some positive records too, as the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces helped to restrain violence. The author underlines the fact that since the end of the 90s the European security partnership is under the challenge of the current worldwide in-security environment; and accordingly, the European governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger”. There was a clear need for upgrading of the European military preparedness in order to be in a better position to deal with the countries which are perceived to be aggressive and irrational like the Milosevic’s regime and those with the threats to global terrorism. As a consequence, we have witnessed the development of the ESDP for worldwide use as well as some enhancements in the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace.226
226 Attina Fulvio and Rossi Rosa – European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues. The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-med”, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, 2004. pp.19-20 |
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The European security partnership has been put to a test in various occasions during the Nineties, namely in former Soviet states and the Balkans. Performance has not been always good, sometimes deceptive. However, the positive role of the security mechanisms cannot be denied in several cases in which the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces helped to restrain violence, and the programs of relief and rehabilitation helped to restore civilian conditions in countries ravaged by internal violence. [Seite 20] Since the last Nineties, the European security partnership is under the challenge of the current worldwide in-security environment (see, for example, Biscop, 2004). Accordingly, the European governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger” (Krause and Latham, 1999: 39). To cope with the problem of containing the policies of governments which are perceived as aggressive, irrational and unreceptive of the cooperative mechanisms (like the Milosevic’s regime), and the problem of dealing with the threats of global terrorism, the European governments have focused on the need for upgrading their countries’ military preparedness. This policy change has many aspects including the development of the ESDP for worldwide use and, in some cases, the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet. |
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[3.] Gd/Fragment 158 26 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 27. November 2014, 23:26 (Hindemith) Erstellt: 22. December 2013, 19:50 Graf Isolan | Attinà 2004, Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 158, Zeilen: 26-30 |
Quelle: Attinà 2004 Seite(n): 22, Zeilen: 20-24 |
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Accordingly, Attina argues that ENP approach to security consists of the classical concepts: i.e. those of comprehensive security – the interdependence of the political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military dimensions – and cooperative security – the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of information, knowledge and expertise. | In such a perspective, it is apparent – as Biscop (2004) has extensively demonstrated - that the Neighbourhood Policy approach to security consists of the classical concepts that distinguish the European regional security partnership of the last thirty years: i.e. the concepts of comprehensive security – as the interdependence between the political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military dimensions - and cooperative security – as the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of information, knowledge and expertise. |
Art und Umfang der Übernahme bleiben ungekennzeichnet, der Autor der Quelle wird aber erwähnt. |
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[4.] Gd/Fragment 092 24 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 25. November 2014, 05:34 (Hindemith) Erstellt: 25. November 2014, 05:33 Hindemith | Fragment, Gd, International Crisis Group 2006, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 92, Zeilen: 24-30 |
Quelle: International Crisis Group 2006 Seite(n): 14, Zeilen: 6ff |
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They submitted an “alternative” Action Plan proposal to the Commission delegation in Tbilisi and in Brussels. It was a tactic step from few representatives of the Georgian civil society in order to participate in Action Plan preparation processes. As a consequence, five representatives were invited to sit on the special commission set up by presidential decree to draft the Action Plan. Besides, NGOs were included in information sharing meetings with the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. | A Georgian civil society coalition submitted an “alternative” Action Plan to the Commission delegation in Tbilisi and in Brussels.152 The initial idea was not to propose an “alternative” but the coalition adopted the tactic when it felt excluded from the official process.153 Five civil society representatives were invited to sit on the special commission set up by presidential decree to draft the Action Plan.154 But the commission met only four times in 2005 and served purely as a consultative body. NGOs were included in information-sharing meetings with the State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.
152 Some 70 Georgian NGOs, divided into five working groups and funded by the Open Society-Georgia Foundation, Eurasia Foundation and Heinrich Böll Foundation, worked on this document, “Recommendations on Georgia’s Action Plan for the European Neighbourhood Policy”. It can be viewed at: http://osgf.ge/miscdocs/eu/ ENG-ENP-Action-Plan-NGO-Recomm.doc. 153 Crisis Group interview with Tinatin Khidasheli, former chair of the Open Society-Georgia Foundation board, February 2006. 154 Civil society was particularly critical of early Action Plan drafts prepared by the government which included no mention of human rights, conflict, or minority issues. They disapprove of the drafting process, which they feel lacked transparency. Some NGO representatives complained drafts were shared with them only after they had been discussed with Brussels. Crisis Group interview, member of the government commission, February 2006. |
Ein Verweis auf die Quelle fehlt. |
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[5.] Gd/Fragment 022 22 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 15. March 2016, 15:03 (Klgn) Erstellt: 15. March 2016, 14:49 Dimpfelmoser | Adams 2001, Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 022, Zeilen: 22-32 |
Quelle: Adams 2001 Seite(n): 47, 48, Zeilen: 08-16, 24-26, 1-4 |
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In the 20th century Baku Oil has had a disproportionate influence on world affairs that continues to today. “Blood, Oil and Politics” are the stuff of contemporary Caucasian history.17
Adams indicates that by 1900, Baku oil production led the world. Under the remarkable leadership of the Nobels and the Rothchilds, it was a centre of technical innovation and global finance. But, Baku was also a centre of conspicuous consumption, which very publicly displayed the worst aspects of unconstrained Capitalism. Baku oil then became a key strategic target for Germany and turkey in their attempts to fuel their war efforts in the World War I. After the war Britain took control of the oil. Caucasian leaders used Baku oil as a political lever to the West in their attempts to secure 17 Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Promoting institutional responses to the challenges in the Caucasus. Favorita Papers 2001. p.46 |
There are many lessons to be learned from the tumultuous history of Baku Oil. In fact it
would seem that Baku Oil in the 20th century has had a disproportionate influence on World Affairs, that continues to today. ”Blood, Oil and Politics” are the stuff of contemporary Caucasian history; and the current challenge is how to create a lasting Peace within this volatile region. By 1900 Baku oil production led the world. Under the remarkable leadership of the Nobels and the Rothchilds it was a centre of technical innovation and global finance. But Baku was also a centre of conspicuous consumption, which very publicly displayed the worst aspects of unconstrained Capitalism. It was a time of social deprivation and exploitation of the Baku oil workers that inevitably created a fertile breeding ground for Bolshevism in the Caucasus. In 1903 a young ex- Georgian priest by the name of Joseph Stalin earned his spurs in the successful organisation of Baku and Tblisi Labour, in their fight against the oil owners. At the same time the imperial politics of Russia inflamed the ethnic conflicts of the Caucasus, between the richer Christian Armenians, and the poorer Muslim workers. The ethnic massacres in Baku of 1905, 1908 and 1918 are as alive today as they were 90 years or so ago. Baku Oil then became a key strategic target for Germany and Turkey in their attempts to fuel their war effort in the First World War. The Western Allies recognised the threat and responded accordingly. With the collapse of war in 1918 Britain took control of Baku Oil. [S. 48] But the Caucasian leaders themselves were ill prepared for their newly found independence from Russia. Nevertheless they still used Baku Oil as a political lever with the West, in their attempts to secure their fragile independence. |
Angesichts der Nennung des Autoren und der Quelle in Anm. 17 kann das Fragement als KW eingestuft werden. |
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[6.] Gd/Fragment 023 01 - Diskussion Bearbeitet: 15. March 2016, 15:30 (Dimpfelmoser) Erstellt: 15. March 2016, 14:59 Dimpfelmoser | Adams 2001, Fragment, Gd, KeineWertung, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel, ZuSichten |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 023, Zeilen: 01-10, 16-21 |
Quelle: Adams 2001 Seite(n): 047, 052, Zeilen: 03-09, 32-37, 32-35, 01-02 |
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their fragile independence in 1918. Unfortunately, in 1919 Lord Curzon in London and President Wilson in Washington decided jointly that the security of the Caucasus was not worthy of the costs involved; consequently, the Bolsheviks occupied the Caucasus and Baku Oil fell under Soviet control for the next 70 years.18 It is an interesting fact, which indicates that the Caucasus was a subject of politico-economic calculations and a concern of USA-Europe vs. Russia in the past as it is today.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Baku Oil has got a huge importance and was to be used as the key political weapon in Caucasian foreign policies, since, as Adams underlines, Caspian oil and gas is the only hope for the region’s economic renewal. The Caspian is important because it is one of the world’s major producing areas in which actual oil production remains essentially in the hands of market-oriented international energy companies. Its particular importance to Europe is that the most of the additional Caspian oil and gas output is to move westwards to European and Mediterranean markets, although some oil will move by tankers to the giant US East Coast market. Besides, Adams declares that the South Caspian area suffers from an excess of gas reserves and a dearth of regional commercial markets. Two thirds of the world’s gas reserves are found within the countries that surround the Caspian Sea. But, with an absence of proximal commercial markets there are few underlying incentives for regional gas development. In the South Caspian the recent offshore giant gas discovery by BP at Shah Deniz (6.6 to 20bcmy) has captured the last remaining market gap in Turkey.19 18 Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Promoting institutional responses to the challenges in the Caucasus. Favorita Papers 2001. p.47 19 Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Promoting institutional responses to the challenges in the Caucasus. Favorita Papers 2001. p.52-53 |
Nevertheless they still used Baku Oil as a political lever with the West, in their attempts to secure their fragile independence. Political expectations were raised but seldom met. In 1919 Lord Curzon in London and President Wilson in Washington decided jointly that the security of the Caucasus was not worthy of the cost involved. The first independent Republics were hastily abandoned to their fate. Lenin, who needed Baku Oil to fuel his own fledgling Russian Revolution, seized the opportunity. The Bolsheviks occupied the Caucasus, and Baku Oil fell under Soviet control for the next 70 years.
[...] Then with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the three independent democratic Republics of the Caucasus returned for a second time. But this time they were to survive. Once more the peoples of the region were plunged into the depths of catastrophic economic chaos, and ethnic conflicts that had been dormant since 1919 again flared up. Baku Oil was once more to be used as the key political weapon in Caucasian foreign policies.
[S. 53] development. In the South Caspian the recent offshore giant gas discovery by BP at Shah Deniz (6.6 to 20bcmy) has captured the last remaining market gap in Turkey. |
Da der Autor im Text und den Anmerkungen genannt wird, kann das Fragment trotz flächiger als KW eingestuft werden. Der Umfang der wortwörtlichen Übernahmen bleibt dem Leser allerdings unklar. |
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