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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 37, Zeilen: 3-28 |
Quelle: Sagramoso 2003 Seite(n): 85, 86, Zeilen: 85:4-19; 86:10-12.15-34 |
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| At the same time, NATO’s such a close cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan, created high expectations of the countries’ governments that NATO would resolve their security challenges. However, it was confusion that NATO would become the new guarantor of peace and security in the region, or even, would assist in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaz or South Ossetian conflicts.
NATO has regularly condemned the use of force in the region and expressed its support for the territorial integrity of the South Caucasian states. However, NATO countries have refrained from getting directly involved in conflict resolution, deferring to other international organizations such as the OSCE or the UN. Not only did NATO not intervene to stop the violence or to impose a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it has not become involved in peacekeeping operations at all along the various cease-fire lines. In all fairness, it must be said that when these conflicts erupted, NATO did not yet have a mandate to intervene in out-of-area operations and conduct peace support operations. It took three years of bloody fighting and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia for NATO to conduct its first air strikes against Serb positions in the summer 1995. Despite NATO’s positive and increased involvement in the region, major shortcomings remain. First of all, NATO managed to address only peripherally the main security threats and challenges effecting countries in the region - i.e. unresolved conflicts, open borders, weak and corrupt state structures, inefficient armed forces, and arms and drug smuggling. NATO’s limited involvement in the South Caucasus, especially as far as peace support operations are concerned, contrasts sharply with the organization’s deep involvement in other parts of Europe, particularly in former Yugoslavia. Only more recently, and within the context of the war on terror, have crucial security issues been addressed, such as the enhancement of border controls. Despite their high value, the NATO PfP and IPAP programs remain limited instruments for resolving the region’s pressing security needs. |
[Seite 85]
Despite NATO’s positive and increased involvement in the region, major shortcomings remain. First of all, NATO managed to address only peripherally the main security threats and challenges affecting countries in the region – i.e. unresolved conflicts, open borders, weak and corrupt state structures, inefficient armed forces, and arms and drug smuggling. NATO’s limited involvement in the South Caucasus, especially as far as peace support operations are concerned, contrasts sharply with the organisation’s deep involvement in other parts of Europe, particularly in former Yugoslavia. Only more recently, and within the context of the war on terror, have crucial security issues been addressed, such as the enhancement of border controls. Their high value notwithstanding, NATO’s PfP programme and the EAPC remain limited instruments for resolving the region’s pressing security needs, in spite of NATO’s efforts to improve the countries’ military and security structures. [Seite 86] This – rightly or wrongly – created high expectations among partner countries, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, that NATO would resolve their security challenges. [...] Such cooperation has led to confusion and created great expectations among South Caucasian states that NATO would become the new guarantor of peace and security in the region and even assist in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. NATO has regularly condemned the use of force in the region and expressed its support for the territorial integrity of the South Caucasian states. However, NATO countries have refrained from getting directly involved in conflict resolution, deferring to other international organisations such as the OSCE or the UN for the peaceful resolution of the disputes. Not only did NATO not intervene to stop the violence or to impose a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Abkhazia, as it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, it has not become involved in peacekeeping operations along the various cease-fire lines. In all fairness, it must be said that when these conflicts erupted NATO did not yet have a mandate to intervene in out-of-area operations and conduct peace support operations. It took three years of bloody fighting and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia for NATO to conduct its first air strikes against Serb positions in the summer of 1995. |
Ohne Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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