Analysis of the European Union’s performance as an international mediator in the South Caucasus with respect to peace building in the region
von George Danielidze
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| [1.] Gd/Fragment 070 09 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 22:13:23 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, International Crisis Group 2006, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 70, Zeilen: 9-13, 17-20 |
Quelle: International Crisis Group 2006 Seite(n): 2, Zeilen: re.Sp. 11-18, 21-26 |
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| So far, the UN and the OSCE have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement. Yet, more than a decade of negotiations led by the UN in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have failed to produce negotiated settlements. Ceasefires have been signed, but gunfire is still exchanged. There are dozens of fatalities each year, including recent (summer 2008) escalations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which grew into the broader Russia-Georgian armed confrontation.
[...] The European Union can offer added value to the efforts of the UN and OSCE. It has at its disposal political and economic instruments to provide incentives and apply conditionality on conflicting parties if it chooses to become more directly involved in ongoing negotiations. |
So far the UN and the OSCE have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement, yet more than a decade of negotiations led by the UN in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have failed to produce negotiated settlements.14 Ceasefires have been signed but gunfire is still exchanged, especially on the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire line, where there are dozens of fatalities each year. The EU, generally more comfortable with a post-conflict rehabilitation and peace building role, has been wary of becoming directly involved in conflict resolution. Yet, it can offer added value to the efforts of the UN and OSCE. It has at its disposal political and economic instruments to provide incentives and apply conditionality on conflicting parties if it chooses to become more directly involved in ongoing negotiations.
14 The Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces was signed by Georgian and Abkhaz officials in Moscow in May 1994; the Sochi Agreement was signed by Presidents Shevardnadze and Yeltsin in June 1992, establishing a ceasefire in South Ossetia; a ceasefire was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh parties in May 1994. |
Kein Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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