von George Danielidze
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| [1.] Gd/Fragment 064 01 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 21:52:19 Guckar | BauernOpfer, Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003b, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop |
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| Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 64, Zeilen: 1ff (komplett) |
Quelle: Lynch 2003b Seite(n): 182, 183, 184, Zeilen: 182:14-36; 183:25-38 - 184:1-7.10-13 |
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| [EU activities in the region included:103]
1. reinforced political dialogue with the three states through the PCA mechanisms, including also EU declarations and statements on developments in and around the region’s conflicts; 2. support to the OSCE in South Ossetia, through EU funding of small-scale rehabilitation programmes on the ground, and the presence of the Commission as an observer in the Joint Control Commission (since April 2001) that runs the Russian-led peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone; 3. some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian occupation and a declared readiness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the case of a settlement between the two parties; 4. support to the Georgian border guards through three Joint Actions, as well as assistance to the OSCE in monitoring sections of the Georgian-Russian border; 5. support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex, jointly controlled by Abkhazia and Georgia. Although these activities are not negligible, EU preferred to stay in a political shadow by not involving itself in peace negotiation processes directly. In early 2001, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat contributed a paper that called for a major review of EU policy to the South Caucasus region. In the first half of 2001, the Swedish presidency set the South Caucasus as one of its priorities. Under this impetus, the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit published its paper on 4 January 2001 and the first ministerial troika visit was made to the capitals of the South Caucasian states in late February 2001. In “Financial Times” on 20 February, was published an article affirming that “the EU cannot afford to neglect the Southern Caucasus”, and pledging a more targeted EU political role to support conflict resolution. The Conclusions of the GAC of 26 February 2001 launched the first phase of a process which ended in July 2003 with the appointment of a Finnish Diplomat as the EU Special Representative to the South Caucasus. The GAC declared indeed that “the EU is willing to play a more active role in the region … and look for ways in which it can support efforts to push and resolve conflicts and contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation.” However, the idea of raising the level of dialogue with important regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States, was never fulfilled.104 103 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. p.182 104 Baev, Cornell – The South Caucasus. ISS, Dec. 2003. pp.183-184 |
[Seite 182]
After 1999, EU activities in the region included: 1. reinforced political dialogue with the three states through the PCA mechanisms, including also EU declarations and statements on developments in and around the region’s conflicts; 2. support to the OSCE in South Ossetia, through EU funding of small-scale rehabilitation programmes on the ground, and the presence of the Commission as an observer in the Joint Control Commission (since April 2001) that runs the Russian-led peacekeeping operation in the conflict zone; 3. some EU support to the rehabilitation of Azeri regions freed from Armenian occupation and a declared readiness to support large-scale rehabilitation in the case of a settlement between the two parties; 4. support to the Georgian border guards through three Joint Actions, as well as assistance to the OSCE in monitoring sections of the Georgian-Russian border; 5. support to the rehabilitation of the Inguri power complex, jointly controlled by Abkhazia and Georgia. These activities are not negligible. In all, however, the EU retained a low profile, with little presence as such in the negotiating mechanisms, no direct involvement in mediation, and an undefined overall strategy to lead policy. [Seite 183] Of more direct relevance, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat contributed a paper in early 2001 that called for a major review of EU policy to the region. Crystallising these trends, in the first half of 2001 the Swedish presidency set the South Caucasus as one of its priorities. Under this impetus, the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit published its paper on 4 January 2001. The first ministerial troika visit to the capitals of the region in late February 2001 reflected Sweden’s determination to allocate more time and energy to the question. Chris Patten and the late Anna Lindh published a joint article in the Financial Times on 20 February affirming that ‘the EU cannot afford to neglect the Southern Caucasus’, and pledging a more targeted EU political role to [Seite 184] support conflict resolution.26 The Conclusions of the GAC of 26 February 2001 launched the process whose first phase ended in July 2003 with the appointment of Heikki Talvitie as EU Special Representative.27 The GAC declared indeed that ‘the EU is willing to play a more active role in the region . . . and look for ways in which it can support efforts to push and resolve conflicts as well as in post-conflict rehabilitation.’ [...] However, the idea of raising the level of dialogue with important regional actors, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia and the United States, was never fulfilled. 26. Financial Times, 20 February 2001. 27. GAC Conclusions (Brussels, 26/27 February 2001, 6506/01 Press 61). |
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Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:Guckar, Zeitstempel: 20131216215235