von George Danielidze
Statistik und Sichtungsnachweis dieser Seite findet sich am Artikelende
[1.] Gd/Fragment 019 12 - Diskussion Zuletzt bearbeitet: 2013-12-16 22:15:18 Guckar | Fragment, Gd, Gesichtet, Lynch 2003, SMWFragment, Schutzlevel sysop, Verschleierung |
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Untersuchte Arbeit: Seite: 19, Zeilen: 12-21, 24-28 |
Quelle: Lynch 2003 Seite(n): 13, 14, Zeilen: 13:14-29.35-37.39 - 14:1-5 |
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The entities that emerged in the South Caucasus after the Soviet collapse could barely be considered as states. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were recognized by the international community, and assumed the various responsibilities that accompany this process, such as seats in the United Nations General Assembly. But in practice, sovereignty hardly existed within the boundaries of these countries. In the first years following the Soviet collapse, Georgia suffered two conflicts with separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia)10 inside its borders, as well as civil war in late 1991. The writ of the Georgian state did not extend far beyond the administrative boundaries of the capital city, Tbilisi, which certainly had no monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Several armed militias vied for power, and parts of the country laid beyond the control of the government. [...]
The South Caucasian countries have come along the way since the early 1990s. Constitutions have been ratified, electoral processes regularized and armed militia groups reigned in. In 2003, the so called Rose Revolution marked the strength of Georgian society as much as the weakness of the state. As Lynch declares, Civil-military relations are poor in each South Caucasus state, either because the military plays too strong role in politics or because [the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces.] 10 To get introduced with short historical overviews and present situations of the conflicts, please see the appendix 2 p.170 |
[Seite 13]
The entities that emerged from the Soviet collapse could barely be considered ‘states’. Georgia, Armenian and Azerbaijan were recognised by the international community, and assumed the various responsibilities that accompany this process, such as seats in the United Nations General Assembly. In practice, sovereignty hardly existed within the boundaries of these states. Nowhere was this more evident than in Georgia in 1992-93. In the first years following the Soviet collapse, Georgia suffered two conflicts with separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) inside its borders, as well as two quasi-civil wars (in late 1991 and autumn 1993). The writ of the Georgian state did not extend far beyond the administrative boundaries of the capital city, Tbilisi, which certainly had no monopoly over the legitimate use of force, to use Max Weber’s definition of the attributes of the modern state. Several armed militias vied for power, and parts of the country lay beyond the control of the government. [...] The South Caucasian states have come along way since the early 1990s. Constitutions have been ratified, electoral processes regularised and armed militia groups (for the most part) reined in. [...] The ‘Rose [Seite 14] Revolution’ marked the strength of Georgian society as much as the weakness of the state. Civil-military relations are poor in each of them, either because the military plays too strong a role in politics or because the civilian leadership has purposefully sought to weaken the armed forces. |
Der Autor der Quelle wird einmal im laufenden Text genannt. Ansonsten erfolgt kein Hinweis auf eine Übernahme. |
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Letzte Bearbeitung dieser Seite: durch Benutzer:Guckar, Zeitstempel: 20131216221536